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Abstract 
The extraordinarily high sex ratio in China has drawn increasing attention from 
researchers and alarmed policy-makers both within and outside the country. This 
thesis empirically identifies the one-child policy as the primary cause for the recent 
increase of sex ratios in China, and then explores the effect of the sex ratios imbalance 
on crime rates. Hence, this thesis consists of two closely related, while independent, 
chapters. 
The first chapter explores a general rule of the one-child policy: the ethnic minorities 
were allowed to give birth to at least two children in the entire 1980s, as a natural 
experiment to identify the effect of the one-child policy on the increase of sex ratios 
in China. Using the Chinese population census in 1990，we find that the one-child 
policy has indeed played a dominant, if not the sole, role in the increase of sex 
ratios in China. The estimated effect on the probability of being a boy is as large 
as 1.01 percentage points for the post-treatment birth cohorts, which implies that 
the strict enforcement of the one-child policy has causally increased the sex ratio at 
birth by 4.4. Further exploration reveals that the policy effect is mainly driven by 
rural residents, and the second and higher birth parities. In addition, the robust 
analysis indicates that the estimated treatment effect is not likely to be confounded 
with the rural household responsibility system reform, the availability and spread of 
modern gender selection technologies, and the epidemic of hepatitis B. 
i 
The second chapter formulates the mechanism by which high sex ratios increase 
crime rates. Two kinds of effects have been introduced which are complementary to 
each other; one is the demographic composition effect, and the other is the marriage 
threshold effect. Under risk aversion and other reasonable assumptions, the theoret-
ical model predicts a positive effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal activities 
through both channels. An empirical model is then specified and implemented by 
using a panel data set of 27 provinces in China over 17 years. Considering the en-
dogeneity of sex ratios in the crime equation, the timings of four Chinese family-
planning programs are used as instruments to identify the causal effect of sex ratios 
imbalance on crime rates. It is found that, consistent with the theoretical prediction, 
a 1% increase of the sex ratio significantly enhances the crime rate by 7-10% after 































I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Junsen Zhang for 
his patient supervision and devotion of his precious time. He has provided detailed, 
thoughtful and constructive comments on almost every aspect of this thesis. This 
thesis would not have been up to this standard without his continuous guidance. 
I would also like to submit my thanks to all those who ever made useful comments 
on this thesis, including Professors Hongbin Li, Tai Leung Chong, Lena Edlund, and 
Wing Suen. In particular, Professor Li has closely guided my empirical work. I am 
alone responsible for any errors that may remain. 
V 
Contents 
1 The Effect of the One-Child Policy on the Sex Ratios Imbalance in 
China 1 
1.1 Introduction 2 
1.2 Background 9 
1.2.1 The One-Child Policy in China 9 
1.2.2 The Increase of the Sex Ratio in China 13 
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Data Description 16 
1.3.1 Empirical Strategy 16 
1.3.2 Data Description 21 
1.4 Empirical Results 25 
1.4.1 Basic Results 25 
1.4.2 The Effect of the One-Child Policy by Registration Type . . . 29 
1.4.3 The Effect of the One-Child Policy by Birth Order 32 
1.5 Sensitivity Analysis 36 
1.5.1 The Dynamic Pattern of the DD estimates by Birth Year . . . 37 
vi 
1.5.2 The Geographic Pattern of the DD Estimates by Provinces 
and Autonomous Regions 41 
1.6 Conclusion 43 
2 The Effect of Sex Ratios Imbalance on Criminal Behavior 45 
2.1 Introduction 46 
2.2 The Mechanism by which High Sex Ratios Increase Crime Rates . . . 53 
2.2.1 Demographic Composition Effect 54 
2.2.2 Marriage Threshold Effect 58 
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Data Description 64 
2.3.1 Empirical strategy 64 
2.3.2 Data Description 67 
2.4 Empirical Results 72 
2.4.1 Fixed Effects Estimation 72 
2.4.2 Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables Estimation 75 
2.5 Robust Tests 82 
2.5.1 Measurement Error of Sex Ratios 82 
2.5.2 Measurement Error of Crime Rates 84 
2.5.3 Omitted Variables 85 
2.6 Conclusion 86 
vii 
Figures and Tables 
Figures 1-2 100 
Figures 3-4 101 
Figures 5-6 102 
Figures 7-8 103 
Figure 9 104 
Table 1.1 105 
Table 1.2 106 
Table 1.3 107 
Table 1.4 刚 
Table 1.5 109 
Table 1.6 110 
Table 1.7 ⑴ 
Table 1.8 112 
Table 2.1 113 
Table 2.2 114 
Table 2.3 115 
Table 2.4 116 
Table 2.5 117 
viii 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 118 
Appendix II 120 
Appendix III 121 
ix 
Chapter 1 
The Effect of the One-Child Policy 




The strictly enforced Birth Planning policy of the Chinese government, which is 
known as the one-child policy in Western societies/ has been in the centre of con-
troversy both within and outside China since its first enactment in the late 1970s 
(Chow, 2002a; Banister, 1987; Scharping, 2003). Although it may have effectively 
reduced the fertility rate (Li et al., 2006; Li and Zhang, 2006; McElroy and Yang, 
2000; Yang and Chen, 2004), and positively contributed to the economic growth in 
the past three decades (Li and Zhang, 2007), it has been argued that the one-child 
policy may have other negative demographic, social, and economic effects on human 
beings (Chow, 2002b). Among them, one possible outcome suggested is the drastic 
increase of sex ratios in China, which has coincided with the promulgation of the 
one-child policy (Zeng et al., 1993; Yang and Chen, 2004). According to the recent 
three waves of population census in China, the sex ratio at birth has drastically 
increased from 108.5 in 1981, to 113.8 in 1990，and to 119.9 in 2000 (NBS, 2002).^ 
Hence, the problem of the sex ratio imbalance has drawn increasing attention from 
both government officers and academic researchers, and has been even heavily ad-
dressed in the recent two annual Chinese Government Reports of 2006 and 2007, 
respectively.3 
The correlation between the one-child policy and the increase of sex ratios has 
iThis may be due to the required payment of a "social compensation fee" for couples having 
more than one child except under certain prescribed conditions. 
2Sex ratio is defined as the number of males per 100 females in the refcrcncc population. 
3In the recent two sessions of the Tenth National People's Congress, Wen Jiabao, the Premier 
of the Chinese State Council, has said "to take effective steps to correct the gender imbalance in 
newborns" in the Report on the Work of the Government in 2006, and further promised "to take 
a full range of measures to address the gender imbalance in babies" in 2007 (Wen, 2006，2007). 
2 
been suggested by previous research (Qian, 2006b; Li, 2002; Ebenstein, 2007). How-
ever, considering the instrument-varying, time-varying, and region-varying natures 
of the implementation of the one-child policy, and that the timing of its enactment 
was just coincidental to the rural household responsibility system reform, and the 
availability and spread of modern gender selection technologies, most of these stud-
ies may suffer from problems of measurement errors, omitted variables, and reverse 
caiisality.4 So far, the establishment of causality between the one-child policy and 
the sex ratios imbalance has been weak. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter 
is to try to fill this gap by quantitatively examining the casual effect of the one-child 
policy on the sex ratio imbalance at the national level in China. 
After the first observation of that "100 million women were missing" in the world 
by Sen (1990, 1992), the problem of sex ratios imbalance, especially in China, India, 
and other Asian countries, has inspired a large body of research by both economists 
and demographers (e.g., Banister, 2004; Coale, 1991; Coale and Banister, 1994; 
Clark, 2000).5 However, there is still a serious debate over the causes of the increase 
of sex ratios in both economics and demography (Oster, 2005, 2006; Gupta, 2005). 
Considering the far-reaching consequences of the persisting sex ratio imbalance on 
both the marriage market and the labor market (Angrist, 2002; Becker, 1991; Rao; 
1993, Chiappori et al , 2002),® and even on the crime market (Dreze and Khera, 2000; 
Mitra, 1992; Oldenburg, 1992)，the identification of the causes of the high sex ratio 
• 4 It will be discusscd in detail in the next section. 
5Although the estimated number of "missing women" was lowered to 60 million in a more 
detailed analysis (Coale, 1991), this is still a shocking number. 
6 Edlund (1999) suggested that the cndogenized sex ratio by the son preference may systemati-
cally degenerate girls to be born in low-status families. 
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in China is of primary importance, especially from the perspective of policy-making. 
An array of factors have been suggested to be associated with the increase of 
sex ratios in China by previous research. It could be largely classified into two 
categories, i.e., with and without human intervention. On the one hand, a majority 
of research on the causes of high sex ratios in China believes that human intervention 
has played a fundamental role. Along this line, both the traditionally pure son 
preference and different expected returns from boys and girls lead parents to practice 
gender selection behavior/ In addition, the availability and spread of modern gender 
selection technologies, especially the ultrasound B machine, have facilitated this 
gender selection process. 
The explanations for the high sex ratio in China without human intervention, 
on the other hand, seek to base their justification on biological or physiological 
differences between the Asians and the Occidentals. A recent representative study 
from this perspective is Oster (2005). Extrapolating from medical studies indicating 
that women infected with hepatitis B virus could have a higher probability of giving 
birth to sons, Oster estimated that around 75% of the "missing women" in China 
could be attributed to an ever prevalent epidemic virus in Asia, hepatitis B. This 
hepatitis B story was also disseminated by Barro (2005) in Business Week: "the 
7The pure son preference is embodied in the Confucian tradition that the offsprings only inherit 
the father's name; and that the different expected return from boys and girls is reflcctcd by the 
gender gap in the human capital investment return rates, wage rates, and the responsibility of the 
old age pension support for parents, etc. From the theoretical perspective, the distinction between 
the pure son preference and different expected returns should be distinctively modeled, bccause 
the former should be reflected in the utility function and the latter is incorporated in the budget 
constraint. As discussed in Leung (1991), however, these two factors are entangled and reinforced 
by each other. Hence, the term "son preference" used in this thesis is defined in a broad sense, 
referring to both the pure son preference and the different expected returns from different genders. 
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culprit may not be government policy, but hepatitis B virus".® 
However, this chapter would like to argue that it is the government policy, i.e., 
the one-child policy, that should take the dominant, if not the sole, responsibility for 
the increase of sex ratios in China, at least in the entire 1980s. The justification for 
the essential role that the one-child policy has played in the sex ratio increase story 
lies in the conflict between the son preference and the strictly regulated family size. 
In fact, the first recorded son preference in literature dates to as early as 1100 B.C. in 
the first collection of poetry in China, Book of Odes (Shi Jing), more than 600 years 
before the birth of Confucius.^ With the cultural, political, and economic evolution, 
a system of institutions and regulations have become involved in complementing the 
dominant status of males in society. For example, only fathers' names can be passed 
to children, only male children have the privilege of claiming heritage, and only male 
children take the responsibility of old age pension for parents, while married females 
should live in their husbands' families and follow their husbands' surnames after 
marriage. 
Since boys and girls are not perfect substitutes to each other in the household's 
utility function, or in the production function, girls are also demanded in large 
families. However, the demand for boys will dominate the demand for girls in the 
8 Recently, Norbcrg (2004) found that the partnership status may influence human sex ratio at 
birth. 
9Chapter 4, Section 2, of the Book of Odes (about 1100 B .C.) , the oldest collection of Chinese 
poetry, has preserved the first recorded gender gap in both families and societies. It states "Sons 
shall be born to him: they will be put to sleep on couches; they will be clothed in robes; they 
will have sceptres to play with; their cry will be loud. They will be hereafter resplendent with red 
knee-covers, the king, the princes of the land. Daughters shall be born to him: They will be put to 
sleep on the ground; they will be clothed with wrappers; they will have tiles to play with. It will 
be theirs neither to do wrong nor to do good. Only about the spirits and the food will they have 
to think, and to cause no sorrow to their parents". 
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case that the fertility is bound, especially in the case that only one child is permitted 
be born, because the expected income or utility derived from boys surpass those from 
girls. The preference for balanced gender compositions in larger families and biased 
ones in smaller families were revealed in a detailed fertility survey conducted in a 
county of rural central China in 2000 (Chu, 2001). On the one hand, among the 820 
married women interviewed, 85% responded that they wanted to have two children if 
there were no restrictions, 99% of these positively responded women preferred "one 
boy, one girl". On the other hand, 95% of the interviewees responded that they 
wanted to have a boy if only one child is allowed, and 44% positively answered the 
question "whatever measures are taken you must have a son". 
A ” back-of-the-envelope ” calculation will make the relationship between the reg-
ulated family size and the sex ratio clear. Assuming that "at least one boy" is the 
rule practiced by the parents, which means the continuation of the family's n a m e , 
there is little need to perform the gender selection behavior when the fertility rate 
is above 5 (the average total fertility rate in the pre-treatment period from 1949 to 
1979 is 5.22), because the probability of having no son is less than 2.5%. However, 
when the fertility rate is regulated to 1, or 2 in some exceptional cases, the par-
ents are forced to manipulate gender selection activities, because the probability of 
having no son increases to 50% and 25%. Hence, although the sex ratios imbalance 
could also have existed in traditional Chinese society, the strict implementation of 
i。In Chapter 4’ Meng Zi (Mencius, 288 B.C.), one of the classic books of Confucianism, Mencius 
(the most famous Confucian after Confucius himself) states: "There are three things which are 
unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them". Since only the father's family name can 
be passed down, and the girl will become a member of her husband's family when she is married, 
having no sons is identical to having no posterity in the Confucian tradition. 
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the one-child policy may be the primary driving force for the drastic increase of sex 
ratios in the recent three decades. 
Empirical research on the effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratios imbal-
ance, however, may suffer from the general problems of measurement error, omitted 
variables, and reverse causality in estimating causal effects. Firstly, the instruments 
employed during the implementation of the one-child policy have exhibited great 
variations across times and regions (Peng, 1996). Hence, it is extremely difficult 
to precisely measure the extent of the strictness of the enforcement of this policy. 
Secondly, the affirmative and rigidity of the one-child policy also varies across years 
and regions, which may cast doubt on the credibility of the estimated policy effects 
in cross section cases. Thirdly, since the implementation of the one-child policy 
has been based on local conditions and needs (Short and Zhai, 1998), the observed 
correlation between fines, or other various kinds of policy indices, and sex ratios 
may reflect unobserved cultural, social, and economic heterogeneities. In addition, 
regions with higher fertility rates may result in a stricter one-child policy. Hence, 
there may exist a simultaneous relationship between the one-child policy and the sex 
ratio, because fertility rates and sex ratios are simultaneously determined. Finally, 
the timing of the implementation of the one-child policy was just coincided with the 
availability and spread of modern gender selection technologies, and the rural house-
hold responsibility system form. Since both of these two factors have been suggested 
to take some responsibility for the increase of sex ratios in China, the observed time 
series correlation between the one-child policy and the sex ratio may pick up the 
effect of these omitted variables (Gupta, 2005; Schultz and Zeng, 1999). 
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However, a general rule of the one-child policy across both instruments and re-
gions is that minority women were allowed to have at least two children until the 
end of the 1980s (Park and Han, 1990; Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988). The 
different treatment of the one-child policy across different ethic groups was embod-
ied in various regulations, instructions, and reports (Peng, 1996), and this differing 
treatment was even officially written in the Law of the People 's Republic of China 
on Regional National Autonomy in 1984. n Therefore, by exploiting the different 
treatment between the Han and minorities, this chapter constructs a differences-in-
difFerences (DD) estimator (Angrist and Krueger, 1999) to identify the causal effect 
of the one-child policy on the increase of sex ratios in China. 
To circumvent the problems listed above and to validate our DD estimator, two 
conditions should be satisfied. Firstly, the policy intervention itself should not be 
endogenous (Bertrand et al.，2004; Besley and Case, 2000; Heckman, 2000)，i.e., 
the different treatments of the one-child policy on different ethnic groups should 
not be based on different sex ratios, or different fertility rates, between the Han 
and minorities. Prom the early documents of the motivation and implementation of 
the one-child policy, however, the decision of the non-treatment of minorities was 
primarily driven by political considerations rather than by different fertility rates. 
Secondly, there should be no other policy shocks, or socioeconomic changes that have 
affected the gender selection behavior between the Han and minorities differently in 
the same period, which has been extensively examined through next sections. 
The results of our DD estimation indicate that the one-child policy is indeed the 
^^Article 44’ the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy (1984). 
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primary driving force underlying the increase of sex ratios in China, at least in the 
entire 1980s. The estimated effect on the probability of being a boy is as large as 1.01 
percentage points for the post-treatment birth cohorts. This means that the strict 
enforcement of the one-child policy has causally increased the sex ratio at birth by 
4.4, and 93.62% of the increase of sex ratios for the Han Chinese in the entire 1980s 
can be accounted for by this policy. Further exploration reveals that the policy effect 
is mainly driven by rural residents, and the second and higher birth parities. The 
sensitivity analysis suggests that the estimated treatment effects are not likely to be 
confounded with the rural household responsibility system reform, the availability 
and spread of modern gender selection technologies, the epidemic of hepatitis B, or 
other policy or socioeconomic changes that have affected the Han and minorities' 
fertility behavior differently. 
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 describes the back-
ground of the one-child policy and the increase of sex ratios in China. Section 3 
specifies the empirical strategy and introduces the data set. Section 4 reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 conducts the sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes 
this chapter. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 The One-Child Policy in China 
One unprecedented and distinguished feature of the Chinese Constitution Law is 
that the commitment to birth planning is the duty of citizens and the task of lower 
9 
level administrations. 12 In fact, the primary motivation for the strict enforcement 
of the one-child policy was based on food supply considerations rather than on the 
realization of the ambitious Four Modernizations plan (Banister, 1987). After the 
termination of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the Chinese leadership was shocked 
by the fact that, while the grain production in 1977 stagnated at the level of 1955, 
the overall population had increased by almost 50%, from 614 million in 1955 to 
949 million in 1977.13 Therefore, the fear of a Malthusian catastrophe compelled 
the Communist leaders to take a radical birth planning policy, the one-child policy, 
beginning in the late 1970s, which is possibly the largest social experiment in human 
history. Other major factors underlying the motivation of the one-child policy were 
all related to the overpopulation in China: unemployment in the urban areas, bottle-
necks in the education, health, housing systems, and environmental problems. 
After the promulgation of the one-child policy in the late 1970s, its implemen-
tation has exhibited three distinctive features, which may bring problems to the 
estimation of the demographic, social, or economic effects of the one-child policy. 
Firstly, the instruments employed during the implementation of the one-child policy 
have exhibited great diversifications, ranging from the mild methods of economic 
incentives and sanctions, propaganda and educational work, effective diffusion of 
contraceptives, and commitment and subscription of the One-Child Certification, 
mandatory lUD insertions, to other extreme sanctions such as the refusal of wa-
ter and electricity supplies, unroofing of peasant families' homes who violated the 
12Article 49，Constitution Law of the People's Republic of China. 
The cultivated area per capita shrunk from 0.22 hectares in 1949 to 0.08 in 1977，far below the 
world standards, in which about half of the acreage consisted of low-yield areas (Scharping, 2003). 
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birth-planning rules, enforced abortion for above quota pregnancies, etc. (Scharping, 
2003). In addition, the adoptions and emphases of these policy instruments varied 
from year to year, and from place to place. 
Secondly, although the enforced one-child policy began as early as 1979, the offi-
cial Population and Family Planning Law of the People ,s Republic of China was only 
enacted as late as 2002. Hence, the promulgations of the one-child policy had been 
through various executive regulations and government reports, which have seen dif-
ferent rigidities or elasticities in different stages, with different policies contradicting 
to one another which were even enacted in the same time (Short and Zhai, 1998). 
For example, the release of Central Document 7 in 1984 eased the strictly enforced 
one-child policy to a large extent, and explicitly specified the conditions under which 
two children were allowed. However, a mechanism called the family planning respon-
sibility system was introduced in the same year to hold all government cadres more 
accountable for successful implementations. In practice, the one-child policy appears 
to be a system of policies. 
Thirdly, after the rural household responsibility system reform in the early 1980s, 
the central government actually lost the ability to control peasant income, land use, 
and collective welfare funds. Hence, a uniform prescription of economic incentives 
and sanctions, and other implementing methods at the national level were not ex-
ercisable for the central government. For example, considering the fact that the 
country is too vast and diverse, the then head of the National Family Planning 
Commission, Peng Peiyuan, remarked in 1988 that the adoption of a uniform policy 
guideline would be impossible across the whole country (Tien, 1989). Therefore, the 
11 
central government only set the general rules for the one-child policy, while the inter-
pretation, adoption, and implementation were based on local conditions and needs 
(Short and Zhai, 1998). 
Hence, the listed intrument-varying, time-varying, and region-varying natures 
of the implementation of the one-child policy above make the measurement of this 
policy, and the identification of its effect on the sex ratios imbalance extremely 
difficult, especially at the national level. However, there is a general rule with the 
implementation of the one-child policy: the minority women were normally allowed 
to have at least two children until the end of the 1980s, which is invariant across 
implementing instruments, across regions, and across years. In fact, the different 
treatment across different ethnic groups has been embodied in all documents of this 
system of birth planning policies (Peng, 1996), and has even been officially written 
into the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy 
(enacted in 1984).丄^ Therefore, the consistently different treatment of the one-child 
policy between the Han and minorities provides us a precious, if not the unique, 
opportunity to identify the treatment effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratios 
imbalance at the national level in China. 
14 Before the enactment of the Law on Regional National Autonomy in 1984, there was no explicit 
birth planning policy on the minorities. The Law on Regional National Autonomy stated, firstly, 
that there should also be family planning policy for those minority groups, but autonomous regions 
could have their own birth control regulations, and could be less restrictive than the Han. In 1984, 
however, the ccntral government suggested that cthnic groups with a population of more than 10 
million were encouraged to practicc the one-child policy (Peng, 1996). However, until the end 
of the 1980s, there was only one ethnic group, Zhuang, with a population cxcceding 10 million 
after 1988. The government of the Guangxi Autonomous Region, where most of the Zhuang ethic 
nationalities living, then cnacted the Regulation of Family Planning Trial Implementation of the 
One-Child Policy on 17 September, 1988, which was officially promulgated on 1 January, 1989 
(Guangxi Autonomous Government, 1988). Therefore, most of the minority women were allowed 
to have more than one child in the entire 1980s. 
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1.2.2 The Increase of the Sex Ratio in China 
Although the scattered historical statistics indicate that China had experienced a 
higher sex ratio than the western countries before 1949, the fluctuation of the sex 
ratio at birth had been around the biologically stable range of 104-107 from the 
foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the beginning of the 
strict enforcement of the one-child policy in 1979, except for those birth cohorts 
of 1955-1958，which will be discussed later (Almond et a l , 2007; Gupta, 2005). 
This "abnormally" normal sex ratio story in a traditional patriarchy country, China, 
is also confirmed by Coale and Banister (1994). Based on four modern waves of 
the Chinese population census after 1949，and two large-scale retrospective fertility 
surveys, Coale and Banister have systematically documented the sex ratio from the 
birth cohort of 1936-1940 to the cohort of 1985-1989, and convincingly demonstrated 
that the reported sex ratio at birth was very close to 106-107 in the entire 1960s and 
the 1970S.15 
Figure 1 depicts the time series dynamics of the sex ratio by birth cohort from 
1949 to 1990 projected by the Chinese population census in 1990.16 It confirms that 
the sex ratio in the pre-treatment period until 1979 is relatively lower and remains 
around the stable range with the exception of those birth cohorts just prior to the 
Great Famine. In fact, the mean value of the sex ratio for the birth cohorts from 
1949 to 1978 is 106.6. Therefore, before exploring of the causes for the abrupt and 
The four modern population censuses in China used in Coale and Banister (1994) were held in 
1953, 1964, 1982, and 1990; and the two retrospective fertility surveys were carried out in 1982 and 
1988, respectively. 
This figure is very similar to Figure 2 in Coale and Banister (1994, p. 466) except that their 
cohort analysis has been taken in a five-year moving average form. 
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drastic increase of sex ratios in the 1980s, we need to understand the reasons for the 
relative stability of the sex ratio in the pre-treatment period. 
First of all, there was no strict enforcement of the one-child policy during these 
three decades, and the regulation of the family planning policy was weakened, even 
abandoned, by Chairman Mao's strong propagandized ideology of "the more people, 
the more power" (Scharping, 2003). In fact, the total fertility rate (TFR) is higher 
than 5 in most years, and the mean value is 5.22 (with a standard error of 0.23)， 
during the pre-treatment period of 1949-1979 (NSB, 2002). If "at least one boy" is 
the rule practiced for the parents' gender composition choice of children, there is little 
need for the parents to exercise gender selection behavior, because the probability of 
having no son is only 2.2% when the average fertility level is 5.22.17 However, when 
the TFR decreased to 2.10 in 1990 and 1.22 in 2000，the probability of having no son 
increased to 22.4% and 41.9%, respectively. Therefore, considering the extremely 
low probability of having no son in the case of high fertility rates, and the mental, 
physical, and material costs associated with the practice of gender selection, there 
was little need for the parents to manipulate the gender composition of children. 
Secondly, in order to fulfill the doctrine of communism, and especially of the 
equality between males and females, childbirth has in fact been considered as a 
kind of collective behavior. Children were viewed as collective property, and child 
rearing was even taken to be the collective responsibility at the village, community, 
or firm level, in the whole collective farming regime. ^ ^ Hence, the private expected 
17The probability of having no son in case the TFR is 5.22 is 0.495.22，which equals to 0.022. 
18In fact, in the era of planned economy in China, cach state owned enterprise (SOE) had their 
own hospital or infirmary, nursery school, kindergarten, primary school, and large SOEs could 
even have their own technical schools and colleges. These medical and educational establishments 
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return from children differed from the public expected return in the pre-treatment 
period. Although the public expected return may differ between males and females, 
which was due to the characteristic differences across genders, the private expected 
return, or the private reward, was forced to be equal between different genders by the 
government. Therefore, there was little economic incentives for parents to practice 
gender selection behavior. 
Finally, even if the traditional son preference still survived in some places and 
there were economic incentives for gender selection during the pre-treatment period, 
there was little chance for parents to implement gender selection in the collective 
farming regime because abortion was extremely prohibited in the Mao era, even 
at the risk of the mother's health, and the medical system was strictly regulated 
(Scharping, 2003). During the same time, the traditional practice of female infanti-
cide and abandonment had been largely mitigated, except under some unusual cases, 
such as in the Great Famine. 
The exceptionally high sex ratio for the 1955-1958 birth cohorts may lend support 
to our hypothesized interaction between the regulated family size and the sex ratio 
discussed above. Born just before the Great Famine of 1958-1961，these birth cohorts 
had experienced extreme starvation in their babyhood. The scarcity of food forced 
the parents to face the moral dilemma of having to choose between the girl or boy. 
Hence, although the female mortality rate should be biologically lower than males in 
the early life stage, the survival rate of males was higher than females for the birth 
cohorts of 1955-1958, which means that the biased sex ratio during this exceptional 
exclusively served the children of the SOE employees for almost free before the economic reform of 
1978. 
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period may have been mainly manipulated by "human selection", rather than by 
"natural selection" (Almond et al., 2007). 
The discussion of the relatively "normal" sex ratio in the pre-treatment period 
above provides three potential explanations for the increase of the sex ratio beginning 
from 1979: (i) the strictly enforced one-child policy which has bounded the house-
hold's fertility behavior and greatly increased the probability of having no sons; (ii) 
the rural household responsibility system reform which has equated the public re-
turns to private returns, and has allowed different private rewards across genders; 
(iii) the progress of gender selection technologies which may have facilitated the 
gender selection process. Since these three events all coincided with the Chinese 
market-oriented economic reform in the late 1970s, aggregate time series analysis 
may be unable to disentangle these three factors. Therefore, an empirical strategy 
of differences-in-differences (DD) estimation, which is appropriate in identifying the 
effect of the one-child policy, will be presented in the next section. 
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Data Description 
1.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
As discussed in the previous section, the different treatment of the one-child policy 
between the Han and minorities could serve as a natural experiment to identify the 
causal effect on the sex ratios imbalance. Since the one-child policy only applied to 
the Han, we have the Han Chinese as the treatment group and the ethnic minorities 
as the control group. Let Si be the child i's gender status; = 1 if the child is a 
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boy, otherwise 0. In addition, let H and T be the ethnic and birth cohort indicators, 
respectively. H equals 1 for a Han child, and T equals 1 if the child was born in 
the post-treatment period (later than 1979). Then the share of boys out of the Han 
children born in the one-child policy regime is E{Si\H = l^T = l).i9 Thus, we use 
the following DD framework to control for the systematic differences both across 
ethnic groups and across birth cohorts. Differencing the mean value of Si across 
birth cohorts and ethnic groups gives 
DD= [E{Si\H= l,T = l)-E{Si\H = l,T = 0)]-
[E{Si\H = 0 ’ r = 1) - E{Si\H = 0,T = 0)]. (1.1) 
In the expression above, our estimated DD captures the causal effect of the one-
child policy on the sex ratios imbalance. Specifically, the time-invariant and ethnic-
specific factors are cleared out in the first two differences of E{Si\H = 1, T = 1)— 
E{Si\H = l , r = 0) and 五 二 0，T= 1) -E{Si\H = 0,T = 0), respectively. For 
example, the long-standing difference of the cultural background between the Han 
and minorities is removed in this stage. Then, any changes that are not due to the 
intervention of the one-child policy, while common to both the Han and minorities, 
are eliminated in the second difference of AE{Si\H 二 1) _ AE{Si\H = 0). 
In practice, the following regression-adjusted DD model is used to identify the 
Following conventional practice, the sex ratio discussed in previous sections is defined as the 
number of males per 100 females at a population level. However, the concept we employed in the 
empirical part will focus on the gender of the child who has been born in a certain period at the 
individual level. In fact, these two concepts arc identical. For example, the sex ratio for the ethnic 
minorities in the post-treatment period equals to = 0,T = l)/[l-E{Si\H = 0 ’T = 1)]. 
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effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratios imbalance 
二 ao + aiHi + oo^ Ti + asifii x T]) + X'^p + a, (1.2) 
where the two dummy variables, Hi and T ,^ pick up the ethnic and time effects, 
respectively.20 The coefficient of our interest is 0:3 before the interactive term of 
Hi X Ti, which captures the treatment effect of the one-child policy on the gender of 
the child who was born in the treatment period. In fact, as is identical to our DD in 
Eq.(l).2i The added vector of variables Xi is to control for other demographic, geo-
graphic, and parental characteristics, which may also be correlated with the gender 
selection behavior. Controlling for Xi changes the estimate of 0:3 only if Hi x Tj and 
Xi are correlated, conditional on the ethnic and time effects. 
As discussed in Angrist and Krueger (1999), the key identifying assumption of 
the DD estimator is that the interaction term of Hi x is zero in the absence of 
the one-child policy. In other words, to bias the asymptotic consistency of the DD 
estimates in Eq.(2), there must exist other factors which have different effects on 
the gender selection behavior between the Han and minorities across the pre- and 
post-treatment periods. Hence, the possibilities of the rural household responsibility 
system reform and the spread of gender selection technologies, which have been 
discussed in previous sections, and the hepatitis B story advanced by Oster (2005), 
will be discussed in turn. 
2°Since most of our analysis involves comparing the means between groups, linear (OLS) is 
adopted in this chapter. However, using the probit model generates very similar results in our 
empirical analysis. 
21 Substituting Eq.(2) into (1) gives DD = 
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First of all, there is no government document, official report, or academic research 
that can be found to support different treatments of the rural institutional reform 
across different ethnic groups until now. However, Lin (1988) and Schultz and Zeng 
(1999) suggested that the timing of the adoption of this rural institutional reform 
had varied across provinces and regions. Since China's ethnic groups are unevenly 
distributed across the whole nation, there could still be a possible correlation be-
tween the timing of the rural institutional reform and the distribution of the ethnic 
minorities. If our DD estimate was mainly picking the effect of different treatments 
of the rural reform across ethnic groups, however, it could be expected that the esti-
mated effect of the one-child policy would be insignificant in the late 1980s, especially 
in the rural areas. The reason is that almost all the production teams in China had 
adopted the household responsibility system by 1990 (Lin, 1997). 
Secondly, as argued by previous research, it seems reasonable that the availabil-
ity and spread of gender selection technologies, especially the ultrasound B machine, 
may have contributed to the increase of sex ratios in China. However, in our DD esti-
mates, the common technological progress of gender selection across ethnic groups is 
removed from the second difference. In addition, even if the spread of the ultrasound 
B machine was unbalanced across ethnic groups, and the spread of the ultrasound B 
machine could really take the primary responsibility for the increase of sex ratios in 
China, we could expect that the difference in sex ratios across ethnic groups should 
exhibit a converging pattern. 
In fact, the availability of the ultrasound B depends on both the development 
level of the region and the quantity of production and importation. Since the first 
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ultrasound machine B was made in 1979 in China, and only wealthy households were 
able to afford the scan fee, this modern gender selection technology should have been 
accessed earlier in relatively developed regions in the eastern and coastal parts of 
China, where the majority of residents are Han. Therefore, the lagged treatment of 
the technological progress on minorities will lead the difference in sex ratios between 
the Han and minorities to be bigger at first, and then to steadily converge to the 
initial level in the pre-treatment period, when minorities had an equal chance to 
access to this modern technology as the Han, though the average sex ratio may have 
increased to a higher level in this later stage. According to Zeng et al. (1993), after 
the first manufacture of ultrasound B in 1979，China began to introduce ultrasound 
B technology on a large scale in 1982, In fact, China had the capacity to produce 
over 10,000 ultrasound B machine per year in the late 1980s, which meant four such 
machines in each county in China; and each county had actually been equipped with 
machines operated by proficient technicians by then. 
Finally, as far as the biological explanation, hepatitis B, is concerned, two ques-
tions are advanced in our DD estimator: (i) Was there a large scale epidemic of 
hepatitis B exactly after the year of 1979? (ii) Do the infection rates of hepati-
tis B systematically differ between the Han and minorities? Since no detailed data 
concerning the hepatitis B epidemic in China is available, direct checks on both ques-
tions would be unfeasible in this chapter. However, if these two problems have really 
existed, and our DD estimates are mainly driven by this different prevalence of the 
hepatitis B across ethnic groups, a certain pattern of the unbalanced sex ratio could 
be expected, i.e., the estimated effect of the one-child policy should be approximately 
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the same across different birth parities. 
These three different expected patterns of our DD estimates under three alter-
native hypotheses will be extensively examined in following sections. Except for the 
three potentially omitted variables discussed above, one more concern for our DD es-
timates in Eq.(2) is the endogeneity of the policy intervention itself (Bertrand et al , 
2004; Besley and Case, 2000; Heckman, 2000). It means that the different treatment 
of the one-child policy could not be based on different fertility rates, or different sex 
ratios across ethnic groups in our DD estimator. However, as the detailed discus-
sion of the motivation for the strict enforcement of the one-child policy in Section 2 
illustrates, the different treatment of the one-child policy is unlikely to be driven by 
different fertility behavior across ethnic groups, let alone anything on different sex 
ratios. 
1.3.2 Data Description 
The 1% sample of the 1990 Chinese population census, which is the fourth census 
of its kind and collected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), is employed 
to implement the DD estimation discussed above. The benefit from the use of the 
1990 census extends to several dimensions. First of all, to evaluate the effect of the 
one-child policy on the sex ratio at the national level, the advantage of the census 
data is self-evident compared to other surveys which are conducted at the provincial 
level, or even at the county level. Secondly, in contrast to the third population 
census in 1982, the 1990 census allows an appropriately lagged length of time for 
the evaluation of policy effect on the increase of the sex ratio, because 10 years 
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had already passed after the enactment of the one-child policy in 1979. Thirdly, 
before the 1990s, the registration system in China was still strictly regulated. Hence, 
the registration type and other geographic information are very likely to remain 
unchanged. Contrary to the 1990 census, however, the individual and household 
information in the fifth Chinese population census in 2000 should have experienced 
a drastic change after the birth of the children, especially the registration type, which 
is due to the rapid economic development, urbanization, and social reconstruction 
in the past two decades in China. 
Our empirical analysis is conducted on two subsamples from the 1990 census 
data set. Sample 1 refers to all children born after 1972 with ethnic, gender, age, 
registration type, and geographic information, which is the most representative sam-
ple at the national level.22 Then we match those children in Sample 1 to families 
with intact information of mother, father, and siblings to get Sample 2, according 
to the following steps. First of all, we restrict the children in Sample 1 to the sons 
or daughters of household heads, because the individual's identifier in the census is 
referring to the head of the household. Since the only variable containing women's 
retrospective fertility information is the number of children ever born, then in the 
second step we delete any child with a mother for whom the number of her children 
surveyed in the household does not match the reported number of children. Finally, 
as in Angrist and Evans (1998)，we further restrict the sample to those children with 
a mother aged 20-37 to mitigate the sample selection problem. Since the minimum 
22The reason that the birth year is truncated at 1972 is that children born in 1973 are just 17 
years old in the ccnsus year of 1990. Since 18 is the legal minimum age for full-time work in China, 
most children younger than 18 are still economically dependent and living with their parents. 
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age for marriage is 20 as prescribed by the Chinese Marriage Law, restricting the 
mother's age to less than or equal to 37 means the age cutoff of 17 for eldest children 
does not generate a highly selected sample. 
Table 1 gives variable definitions and summary statistics for the two subsamples. 
Gender, Han, Rural、and Treat are four dummy variables indicating the sex, ethnic 
identity, registration type, and birth cohort of the child surveyed. If the child is a 
Han boy with the agricultural Hukou, and was born after 1979, then the values of 
these four variables are all equal to one. In fact, there is another variable describing 
the household's location type, i.e., city, town, or village, in the 1990 census. However, 
since the registration type, i.e., Hukou, and the location type are highly correlated 
(the correlation coefficient is 0.97), only the registration type is chosen to indicate 
the geographic characteristic of the child. Another reason for the selection of the 
registration type is the subtle difference in the treatment of the one-child policy 
for the household with and without agricultural Hukou, while this difference was 
not based on the location type.^^ The education level of the parents are classified 
into four categories: illiterate or semi-literate, primary school, junior high school, 
and senior high school and higher education.^^ Finally, the variable of Family size 
denotes the number of siblings of the child surveyed plus one, which amounts to the 
number of children of the household head. 
23 Considering the high correlation between the agricultural Hukou and the geographic location 
in rural areas, the interpretation of the variable Rural in the following part of this paper is ex-
changeable with the agricultural Hukou. 
2''There is a total of seven education levels in the 1990 census: Illiterate and semi-litcrate, primary 
school, junior high school, senior high school, technical school, junior collcge, university and above. 
Since the sample size for senior high school and above is small, these four higher levels of education 
arc grouped into one category: senior high school and higher education. 
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The mean value of Gender in Sample 1，which should be considered as the bench-
mark in the empirical analysis, is 0.5196, which implies that the mean value of the 
sex ratio is 108.2, higher than the biologically stable range of 104-107. As far as 
other variables are concerned, of these children in Sample 1，90.29% are Han Chi-
nese, 84.09% with the agricultural Hukou, and 60.55% were born in post-treatment 
period. Compared to Sample 1，the mean value of Gender in Sample 2 is 0.5235, 
which implies that the mean value of the sex ratio is 109.9. The reason for this 
higher mean value of Gender in Sample 2 results from the higher mean value of 
Treat. In contrast to the fact that 60.55% of the children were born in the post-
treatment period in Sample 1，the mean value of Treat in Sample 2 is 0.8053，which 
means that children born in the treated period is weighted more heavily in Sample 
2 than in Sample 1. Since the sex ratio in the post-treatment period is higher than 
in the pre-treatment period, then the mean value of Gender is relatively higher in 
Sample 2. Table 1 also shows that mothers have an inferior education attainment 
than fathers. Although only 6.17% of surveyed children's fathers are illiterate or 
semi-literate, there is as high as 23.27% of the mothers falling into this category. 
Finally, the additional variable of Family size in Sample 2 indicates that each child 
has 1.26 siblings on the average in a household. 
To gain a picture of how the Han differs from the minorities, Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics by ethnic group. Several aspects in Table 2 are worth noting. 
First of all, the significant differences of Gender, Rural, and Treat between the Han 
Chinese and minorities are consistent across both samples. The sex ratio of the Han 
is higher than minorities; more minority children are living in rural areas and were 
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born in the post-treatment period than Han children. Secondly, the educational level 
of both mothers and fathers of the Han children is higher than those of minorities. 
It indicates that there may be some intrinsic differences between the Han and mi-
norities, which could validate the empirical strategy of our DD estimator. Finally, 
Family size of the minority households is larger than those of the Han, which means 
that the one-child policy may have indeed decreased the fertility rate of the Han?^ 
With the comparisons of the summary statistics between the Han and minorities 
and across both samples in mind, we carry out the empirical analysis in the next 
section. 
1.4 Empirical Results 
This section systematically examines the effect of the one-child policy on the increase 
of sex ratios in the 1980s. We carry out the DD estimation of Eq.(l)-(2) without and 
with the control vector of geographic indicators first, then we estimate the treatment 
effect by registration type and birth order, respectively. 
1.4.1 Basic Results 
Before presenting the DD estimates, Figure 2 plots the sex ratio by the Han and 
minorities by birth year. A preliminary inspection of Figure 2 gives us a strong 
impression of a structural break of the difference in sex ratios between the Han and 
minorities in the late 1970s. Although there is no systematical difference of the sex 
25 Since the differences between the Han and minorities in Table 2 arc all statistically significant 
at a high level of 1%, the ^-statistics are not reported. 
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ratio between the Han and minorities before the initiation of the one-child policy in 
1979, the sex ratio of minorities is consistently lower than the Han during the entire 
1980s. The structural break of the difference between the Han and minorities in the 
late 1970s is clearly illustrated in Figure 3, in which the difference between the Han 
and the minorities has fluctuated around the mean value of 0.73 (with a standard 
error of 2.08) in the entire pre-treatment period from 1950 to 1979, before rising to 
a higher mean value of 4.75 (with a standard error of 1.51) in the post-treatment 
period. 
Based on Sample 1，Table 3 reports the DD estimates of the treatment effect of 
the one-child policy on the gender of the child by birth cohort. Considering the space 
constraint, we group the children born in the pre-treatment period together and only 
report the statistics for those pre-treatment observations as a whole in the first row. 
However, in order to check the robustness of our DD estimates, and to see the time 
series dynamics of the one-child policy effect, we report the DD estimates for the 
post-treatment period by birth cohort in the next rows. Furthermore, the average 
treatment effect of the one-child policy during the entire post-treatment period is 
also reported in the last row of Table 3. 
Columns (2)-(3) in Table 3 report the mean value of Gender for the Han and 
minorities, respectively. Column (4) reports the difference of Gender between the 
Han and minorities with the i-statistics in the parentheses. Several points deserve 
some attention. Firstly, there is little differences between the Han and minorities 
in the whole pre-treatment period, and the magnitude of the difference is only 
0.0004, which is very trivial and insignificant at any reasonable level. Secondly, 
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the magnitude of the difference is considerable, as large as 0.0110, for the whole 
post-treatment period with a i-statistic of 10.02，which is highly significant at the 
level of 1%. It means that sex ratio of the Han is on the average higher than the 
minorities by 4.7 in the entire post-treatment period.26 Finally, the differences are 
consistently positive for each birth cohort in the entire post-treatment period, which 
are all significant at the conventional level of 5% except for the only birth cohort of 
1986. 
Column (5) reports the DD estimates in Eq.(l). In fact, Column (5) equals to 
Column (4) after the subtraction of 0.0004, which is the difference of sex ratios be-
tween the Han and minorities in the pre-treatment period. Hence, the DD estimates 
reported in Column (5) should reflect the treatment effect of the one-child policy on 
sex ratios, since both the nationality-specific, time-invarying factors, and the time-
varying, nationality-invarying factors have been cleared out. Similar to Column (4), 
the DD estimates for all birth cohorts in the post-treatment of Column 5 are signifi-
cantly positive at the conventional level of 10% with the only exception of the birth 
cohort of 1986. The DD estimate for the entire post-treatment period, presented in 
the last row of Column (5)，is 0.0106 at the significance level of 1%. 
Columns (6)-(7) in Table 3 report the DD estimates by including the provincial 
and rural indicators as the control variable vector Xi in E q . ⑶ . I f the provincial and 
rural indicators are correlated with the interaction term of Hi x 7] in Eq.(2), the DD 
estimates in Columns (6)-(7) should exhibit significant changes compared to Column 
26 According to Footnote 19, the difference in sex ratios between the Han and minorities in the 
post-treatment period is given by 100 * [0.5234/(1 — 0.5234) - 0.5124/(1 - 0.5124)], which equals 
4.7. 
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(5)，conditional on the Hi and Ti. Interestingly, we find that all the DD estimates 
in Columns (6)-(7) are still significant at the conventional level of 10% except for 
the same birth cohort of 1986. On the average, the DD estimate for the whole birth 
cohorts in the post-treatment period is 0.0101 at the significance level of 1%. It 
implies that the strict enforcement of the one-child policy has significantly increased 
the sex ratio for the Han by 4.4, which can account for 93.62% of the increase of sex 
ratios for the Han Chinese in the entire 
Although our DD estimates in Columns (5)-(7) are consistently positive and 
statistically significant at the conventional level of 10% except for the only birth 
cohort of 1986，a close scrutiny over Table 3 reveals that two patterns deserve further 
exploration. Firstly, the estimated effects of the one-child policy have exhibited a 
considerable variation across birth cohorts, almost tripling from 0.0046 in 1986 to 
0.0136 in 1990. Secondly, the differences between the DD estimates without and with 
geographic indicators have also experienced a significant change across birth cohorts 
by comparing Columns (5) with (6)-(7). The implication of these two dynamic 
patterns of both the estimated effects and the differences in the DD estimates without 
and with geographic indicators in Table 3 will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next sensitivity analysis section. 
27'phe effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratio of the Han can be calculated by 100 * 
{(0.5153 + 0.0101)/[1 - (0.5153 + 0.0101)] — 0.5153/(1 — 0.5153)}，which equals 4.4. In addition, 
the percentage that the increase of sex ratios of the Han accounted by the implementation of the 
one-child policy can be calculated by 4.4/{100 * [0.5234/(1 - 0.5234) - 0.5153/(1 - 0.5153)]}, which 
equals 93.62%. 
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1.4.2 The Effect of the One-Child Policy by Registration 
Type 
The previous subsection has demonstrated that the one-child policy has significantly 
increased the sex ratio of the post-treatment birth cohorts as a whole. However, 
it is interesting to know how this positive policy effect has operated on different 
groups with different registration types. Although the one-child policy had been 
more strictly implemented in urban areas than in rural areas (Peng, 1996; Zhang 
and Spence, 1992)，the effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratios imbalance may 
be bigger in rural areas than in urban areas. The reason could extend to several 
dimensions. Firstly, the magnitude of the decrease of the total fertility rate (TFR) is 
much bigger in rural areas than in urban areas. For example, while the TFR in the 
urban areas only decreased by 20% from 2.62 in 1972 to 2.10 in 1990, the TFR in 
the rural area decreased by 46% from 5.83 to 3.12 during the same period. Secondly, 
because the agricultural work in rural areas is more labor intensive, the gender gap of 
the marginal productivity may be larger in rural areas than in urban areas. Thirdly, 
the lack of retirement pensions in rural areas compels parents to have a son to avoid 
a misery life in old ages. Finally, the Confucian tradition still survives in rural 
areas to a certain extent, while the urban residents are more open-minded. Hence, 
the continuation of the family's name is considered as one of the most important 
responsibilities to the predecessors, and the demand for sons is stronger in rural 
areas than in urban areas. 
Another objective in estimating the treatment effect of the one-child policy by 
registration type is to test the hypothesis of the rural household responsibility system 
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reform. As we have discussed in previous sections, the enactment of the one-child pol-
icy just coincided with the institutional reform in the rural areas in 1979. Although 
no official document can be found to support different treatments of this institu-
tional reform by ethnic groups, Lin (1988) suggested that the timing of the adoption 
may have depended on regional development levels. Since ethnic minorities, on the 
average, live in less developed regions in China, the timing of the adoption may be 
correlated with the distribution of minority residents. During the same time, Schultz 
and Zeng (1999) demonstrated that the adoption of the institutional reform had a 
significant impact on the fertility behavior in rural China. Similarly, the institu-
tional reform could have also influenced parents' gender selection behavior, because 
it widens the private gains between males and females. However, if our DD estimate 
was mainly picking up the effect of this factor, we would expect that the estimated 
policy effect should be insignificant in the rural subsample in the late 1980s, because 
almost all the production teams had adopted this system by then (Lin, 1997). 
Figures 4-7 depict the difference of sex ratios between the Han and minorities 
by registration type. Figure 4 plots the sex ratios by Han and minorities in rural 
areas from 1949 to 1990. Although the sex ratio of minorities had fluctuated around 
the Han for those birth cohorts before the late 1970s, the sex ratios of minorities 
are consistently lower than the Han after the introduction of the one-child policy 
in 1979. This structural break of the difference between the Han and minorities in 
the late 1970s is more evident in Figure 5，which plots the difference of sex ratios 
between the Han and minorities in rural areas. The mean value of the difference of 
sex ratios between the Han and minorities significantly increased from -0.58 (with 
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a standard error of 2.51) in the pre-treatment period before 1979 to 5.21 (with a 
standard error of 1.86) in the post-treatment period from 1980 to 1990. 
In contrast to Figures 4-5, the difference of sex ratios between the Han and 
minorities in urban areas shows no structural break across the treatment periods 
in Figures 6-7. However, the sex ratio for both the Han and minorities in urban 
areas experienced a significant decrease from the earlier birth cohorts of 1950s to the 
later of 1970s. The reason for the extraordinarily high sex ratio during the period 
from the 1950s-1960s in urban areas may be the heavy-industry oriented strategy 
adopted by the government, which increased the demand for males and then caused 
a gender-biased migration from rural areas to urban areas. In addition, the share of 
urban residents to the total population was less than 15% in the 1950s-1960s, which 
could have made the sex ratio in urban areas very sensitive to the migration (NBS, 
2002). 
Table 4 confirms the different treatment effects of the one-child policy on the 
sex ratios imbalance for different groups of registration type, in which the same DD 
model has been implemented by using the rural and urban subsamples, respectively. 
Column (1) reports the DD estimates of the rural subsample with the heteroskedas-
ticity robust i-statistics in parentheses. Consistent with the DD estimates in Table 
3 for the whole sample, the DD estimates of the rural subsample are consistently 
positive at the significant level of 10% except for the only birth cohort of 1982. In 
addition, after the inclusion of provincial indicators in Column (2)，our DD estimates 
are still significantly positive for most of the birth cohorts. 
However, in contrast to the rural subsample, Columns (3)-(4) show that the DD 
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estimates of the urban subsample are all insignificant at the conventional levels except 
for the only birth cohort of 1982. Moreover, the signs of the DD estimates in the 
urban sample are not consistent across birth cohorts any more, and more than half of 
the DD estimates across birth cohorts are negative, though they are not significant. 
To sum up, the different treatment effects on different subsamples suggest that the 
estimated effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratios imbalance in the whole 
sample of Table 3 is mainly driven by the rural subsample, because 84.09% of the 
children lives in rural areas. In addition, since the estimated treatment effects of the 
rural subsample are still highly significant for those birth cohorts in the late 1980s 
when almost all of the Chinese rural areas had adopted the household responsibility 
system, our DD estimates are not likely to be confounded with this institutional 
reform in rural areas. 
1.4.3 The Effect of the One-Child Policy by Birth Order 
As we have discussed earlier, the suggested explanations of the increase of sex ratios 
in China could be largely classified into two categories: with and without human 
intervention. In fact, these two categories of explanations could be differentiated 
from each other by the gender variation pattern across birth parities. For example, 
if the DD estimates on the whole sample in Table 3 were driven by the different rates 
of prevalence of hepatitis B across ethnic groups, we would expect that the treatment 
effect of the one-child policy should be approximately the same across those children 
of different birth orders. The reason is th^it the probability of giving birth to a boy 
should have increased to a similar extent for different birth parities if the parents are 
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hepatitis B carriers.28 
We carry out the DD estimator of Eq.(2) by birth order in this subsection. Based 
on Sample 2 with complete siblings' information, the third row of each panel in Table 
5 report the estimated treatment effect of the one-child policy on the gender of the 
child by birth order without other control variables. In contrast to the hepatitis B 
hypothesis, the estimated treatment effects have exhibited considerable variations 
across different birth parities. Although the magnitude of the estimated treatment 
effect on the first birth parity is very small and it is statistically insignificant at any 
reasonable level, the DD estimate of the effect of the one-child policy has tripled 
for the second birth parity, and becomes marginally significant at the conventional 
level of 10%. Moreover, the DD estimates on the third and higher birth parities is 
as large as 0.0252，which is statistically significant at the level of 5%. It means that 
the implementation of the one-child policy has, on the average, increased the sex 
ratio by 11.68 on the third and higher birth parities for the Han Chinese. To test 
the robustness of the different treatment effects across birth parities, Table 5 also 
reports the DD estimates by birth order with other control variables in the fourth 
row of each panel. The control variables include rural, mother and father's education 
level, and provincial indicators. It is interesting to find that the variation pattern of 
the treatment effects across birth parities is robust to the inclusion of these control 
variables. 
In fact, the variation pattern of our DD estimates across different birth parities is 
exactly consistent with the one-child policy explanation of the increase of sex ratios 
28In Oster (2005), it is assumed that "carriers of the hepatitis B virus have offspring sex ratios 
around 1.50 boys for each girl". 
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in China. With the regulated birth quota of the one-child policy, the distortion of 
the sex ratio could be focused on the second and higher birth parities. The reason 
is that the required payment for the "above-quota" birth acts like a screener in this 
sex ratio increase scenario. Those parents risking the sanction to give a second or 
third birth should have stronger son preference than those who had only one child on 
average. Furthermore, the imposition of the above-quota birth sanction has indeed 
increased the probability of choosing the gender selection technology on the second 
and higher birth parity even in a homogenous case. 
A simple calculation will make it clear. Since the increase of sex ratios is mainly 
driven by the rural subsample, which has been demonstrated in the previous subsec-
tion, and rural families could give birth to a second child if the first is a girl, parents 
in rural areas would be less likely to practice gender selection behavior on the first 
birth parity. However, if the second conception is a female, the parents would face 
the choice between practicing gender selection and carrying the conception to term 
and then having a third child. Assume the benefit from giving a birth to a son is tt, 
the cost of practicing gender seletion is c, and the monetary sanction of an addition 
above-quota birth is /• Then, if the conception is a female, the probability of choos-
ing the gender selection technology is given by 尸二 — c > - /) , which is an 
increasing function of f?^ 
A corollary of the different treatment effect of the one-child policy across birth 
parities is that this policy effect should also vary across those children with different 
gender composition of elder siblings. If the sex ratios imbalance is indeed driven 
29 Assuming the gender selection technology is perfect, the rearing cost of the boy equals to the 
girl and it is normalized to zero, and the benefit of giving birth to a girl is also normalized to zero. 
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by the interaction between the regulated birth rate and the survived son preference, 
we would expect that the treatment effect is mainly focused on those children with 
(only) elder sisters. In other words, the implementation of the one-child policy should 
aggravate the gender-based stopping behavior in childbearing favoring boys. Thus, 
we carry out the DD estimation of the effect of the one-child policy on the gender of 
the child by both the birth order and the gender composition of elder siblings in Table 
6. Consistent with our expectations, from the third row of each panel in Table 6, it 
is found that the policy effect is only significant for those children born in the second 
parity with an elder sister and in higher parities with two elder sisters. Furthermore, 
the fourth row of each panel shows that the pattern of DD estimates across both 
parities and gender compositions of elder siblings is robust to the inclusion of other 
control variables. 
Since the one-child policy has aggravated the sex-biased stopping behavior, an-
other derived corollary is that, conditional on the family size, the gender of children 
born in the last parity is more likely to be boys, and correspondingly the gender of 
those children in prior parities is more like to be girls. Therefore, we conduct the 
DD estimation of the policy effect on the gender of the child by birth parities and 
family size with the result reported in Table 7. We are interested to find that the 
estimated effects have a significant variation across birth parities and family size. 
As it is expected, the estimated effect is significantly positive for the second birth 
parity, while it is insignificantly negative for the first birth parity, in the two children 
families. If the family size is larger than two, the third panel in Table 7 shows that 
the estimated effects are negative for the first two lower parities and positive for 
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other higher parities. Consistent with our prediction, another impressive finding is 
that the estimated effect is even negative at a high significance level of 1% for the 
second parity in these large families. 
To sum up, the variation pattern of the estimated policy effect across different 
birth parities reflects the fact that the implementation of the one-child policy has 
exacerbated parents' manipulation over the gender composition of their children. It 
implies that the increase of sex ratios in China has resulted from parents' gender 
selection activities under the one-child policy regime. Thus, the variation pattern of 
our DD estimates across birth parities validates the strict enforcement of the one-
child policy as the primary cause of the increase of sex ratios in China. During the 
same time, the biological factor of hepatitis B is not likely to be the main force 
underlying the increase of sex ratios in China. 
1.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Although the previous analysis has identified the one-child policy as the primary 
cause for the increase of sex ratios in China, we need to make sure that our DD 
estimates are not mainly picking up the effect of other omitted policy shocks or 
socioeconomic changes. This section then carries out the sensitivity analysis of the 
treatment effect of the one-child policy on the sex ratio. We examine the dynamic 
pattern of the DD estimates by birth year first, then we check the geographic pattern 
of the our DD estimates by provinces and autonomous regions. 
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1.5.1 The Dynamic Pattern of the D D estimates by Birth 
Year 
One concern with the validity of our DD estimates is that the timing of the enforce-
ment of the one-child policy coincided with the availability and widespread use of 
the modern gender selection technology, ultrasound B, beginning in the late 1970s. 
Therefore, if the timing of the availability of ultrasound B varied across different 
ethnic groups in the 1980s, our DD estimates may be confounded with the distrib-
ution of this modern machine, which has been suggested to take a responsibility in 
the increase of sex ratios in China (Gupta, 2006). However, as we have discussed 
in Subsection 3.1, if the estimated treatment effect of the one-child policy in the 
previous section was indeed driven by the prevalence of this machine across ethnic 
groups, a dynamically converging pattern of the DD estimate by birth year would 
be expected. 
Considering the fact that the scan fee was relatively expensive for residents living 
in rural and remote areas in the early 1980s, the ultrasound B would likely have been 
introduced in the relative wealthier regions at first, such as big cities, and eastern 
and coastal areas, where the majority of residents are Han. The Han may have 
then accessed the ultrasound B earlier. Therefore, the lagged access to this modern 
gender selection technology by minorities may make our DD estimates suffer from 
omitted variable problems. However, the difference of the probability of accessing 
to this modern gender selection technology across ethnic groups should have been 
decreasing, because China had begun the introduction of ultrasound B on a large 
scale in 1982, and reached the peak of the importation of this machine during the 
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period of 1985-1989 (Zeng, 1993). Figure 8 plots the dynamic pattern of the DD 
estimates by birth year in the entire post-treatment period, in which the DDI, 
DD2, and DD3 refer to the DD estimates in Columns (5)-(7) in Table 3，respectively. 
Contradicting the ultrasound B hypothesis, the dynamic pattern of the estimated 
effect does not show any converging trend. 
In addition, if our DD estimates in Columns (5)-(7) were mainly driven by differ-
ent timings of access to ultrasound B between the Han and minorities, the dynamic 
pattern of the differences between Column (5) and Columns (6)-(7) should also ex-
hibit a converging trend. Since geographic location is assumed to be the driving 
force underlying our DD estimates, which determines the different probability of ac-
cessing the modern gender selection technology between the Han and minorities, the 
difference between the DD estimates without and with geographic indicators should 
be bigger in the early 1980s when the ultrasound B was first available for the Han. 
Then these differences should be smaller when the difference of accessing ultrasound 
B has decreased to a certain extent in the late 1980s. Figure 9 plots the dynamic 
pattern of the difference of our DD estimates without and with geographic indicators 
by birth year. Contrary to the prediction by the ultrasound B story, the differences 
between Column (5) and Columns (6)-(7) exhibit no converging pattern at all in 
Figure 9. 
Hence, the dynamic patterns of both the DD estimates in Figure 8, and the dif-
ferences of the DD estimates between without and with the geographic indicators in 
Figure 9, safely exclude the ultrasound B story in our DD estimator. In fact, the 
dynamic patterns in both Figures 8 and 9 are exactly consistent with the implemen-
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tation stages and afRrmativeness of the one-child policy in the 1980s. Firstly, the 
rough "U" shape of the dynamic pattern of the DD estimates for the entire 1980s just 
reflects that the one-child policy was strict in the earlier 1980s, before the enactment 
of Central Document 7 relaxing the strictness of the one-child policy to a certain 
extent in 1984，and then began to tighten up in the later 1980s (Hardee-Cleaveland 
and Banister, 1988; Zeng, 1999; Scharping, 2003; Yang and Chen, 2004). 
Secondly, the time series of our DD estimates is surprisingly consistent with 
Scharping's (2003) classification of the stages of the one-child policy. In Scharping 
(2003), the entire post-treatment period is classified into four phases: Drums and 
gongs (the campaign from 1979 to 1983); small holes and big gaps (the relaxation 
from 1984 to 1985); tit for tat (the controversy from 1986 to 1989); and law and order 
(the administration from 1990 to 1999). It is interesting to find that the first three 
stages are clear in the time series of our DD estimates in Figure In addition, 
the three biggest inflexion changes in Figure 8 just correspond to the three biggest 
policy changes in 1982, 1984，and 1986 respectively.^^ 
Thirdly, the relatively mild differences of the DD estimates between Column (5) 
« 
and Columns (6)-(7) in the first half of the 1980s reflect the fact that the one-child 
policy was uniformly implemented across the whole nation, and that little difference 
was allowed across provinces and between rural and urban areas at its early stage. 
30It should be noted that the policy effect may bo roughly lagged one year for the pregnancy 
time. 
31 In December 1982, the commitment for birth planning was unprecedently written in the revised 
Chinese Constitution Law、which decrced it as the citizens' duty and the task of lower level admin-
istrations. Considering the strong resistances encountered, Central Document 7 relaxed the rigid 
one-child policy in the early 1984. Then the resurgence of birth rates leaded to Central Document 
13 issued in May 1986 calling for strict adherence to population targets. 
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After the strong resistance encountered during the policy implementation process, 
especially in rural areas, the central government then began to allow differences 
across provinces, and had made a clear distinction between rural and urban areas 
in 1986 (Peng, 1996). In 1988, Peng Peiyun, the then head of the National Family 
Planning Commission, admitted that the adoption of a uniform policy guidelines 
was impossible across the whole country. Therefore, the inclusion of the geographic 
and rural indicators should decrease the magnitude of the DD estimates in Column 
(5) of Table 3 to a larger extent in the late 1980s. 
Finally, comparing Figure 8 with Figure 9，we find that the two lowest DD esti-
mates for the birth cohorts of 1982 and 1986 in Figure 8 are precisely corresponding 
to the two locally highest points in Figure 9，respectively. It means that the variation 
of the one-child policy across provinces and between rural and urban areas is bigger 
when the policy implementation is weaker. This is just the customary practice in the 
implementation of the one-child policy by the Chinese central government. When 
the rigid one-child policy was relaxed, then the Central Committee of the Family 
Planning allowed different local formulas for incentives and sanctions based on dif-
ferent local conditions. However, when the Central Committee decided to tighten 
up the policy, a stringently unitary campaign was promoted across the whole nation 
(Scharping, 2003). 
To sum up, the high consistency between the dynamic pattern of the estimated 
treatment effect and the stage and affirmativeness of the one-child policy indicates 
that our DD estimates are not likely picking up the effect of other policy shocks or 
socioeconomic changes. 
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1.5.2 The Geographic Pattern of the D D Estimates by Provinces 
and Autonomous Regions 
We have examined the robustness of our DD estimates across time in the previous 
subsection. We now set to explore the geographic pattern of the DD estimates by-
provinces and autonomous regions. In fact, the percentage of minorities living in the 
five autonomous regions to the whole population of minorities in China is higher than 
40%, and these autonomous regions are geographically located near the western and 
southern border of China with distinctly cultural backgrounds from the traditional 
Confucianism of HanP In addition, there has been unbalanced socioeconomic devel-
opment across provinces and autonomous regions after the Chinese economic reform 
in the late 1970s, and the increase of sex ratios in China has been suggested to be 
correlated with the socioeconomic development (Li, 1992; Qian, 2006a). Hence, our 
DD estimates may be confounded with the geographic difference across provinces 
and autonomous regions. 
Table 8 reports the DD estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the 
gender of the child by provinces and autonomous regions in the upper panel, and 
by each autonomous region in the lower panel. Columns (l)-(2) in Table 8 show 
that people living in provinces constitute a dominant share of 91.15% of the total 
population, and 93.59% is Han. Only 8.85% of the Chinese population is living in the 
five autonomous regions, and almost 45% of the residents living there are minorities. 
32In the present paper, the 22 provinces and 4 municipalities in China are grouped together and all 
are treated as provinces. The five autonomous regions are Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, 
and Xinjiang. The two Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao are excluded in 
our analysis. 
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Column (3) reports the DD estimates for the provinces and autonomous regions 
with the heteroskedastic robust ^-statistics in parentheses. It is interesting to find 
that both of these two DD estimates are positive and significant at a high level of 
1%. Furthermore, Column (4) shows that these two DD estimates are robust to the 
inclusion of the rural indicator. The lower panel of Table 8 shows that the estimated 
treatment effects of the one-child policy are all positive for the five autonomous 
regions except for Tibet. The reason for the insignificant and negative DD estimate 
of Tibet may be due to the fact there is only 0.35% of the children who are Han 
in Tibet. In summation, the geographic pattern in Table 8 indicates that our DD 
estimates are not likely to confounded with the geographic difference. 
One interesting finding is that the estimated treatment effect of the one-child 
policy is bigger in the autonomous regions than in the provinces. One possible expla-
nation may be that the agricultural sector is the primary one in these five economies. 
Hence, the gender gap of the marginal productivity in autonomous regions is on the 
average higher than in the rest of China because of the labor intensive nature of 
the agricultural work. A complementary explanation comes from the fact that the 
Han Chinese living in autonomous regions may be subjected to a stricter one-child 
policy than their counterparts in provinces. As shown in Table 3, which has made 
the comparison between the Han and minorities, the Han Chinese systematically 
have a better education attainment than minorities. Then, the Han Chinese living 
in autonomous regions are more likely to work in public sectors, and the one-child 
policy has been implemented more stringent in these sectors (Peng, 1996). 
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1.6 Conclusion 
Exploring a distinct feature of the one-child policy, i.e., it only applied to the Han 
Chinese in the entire 1980s, this chapter constructs a DD estimator to identify the 
effect of the one-child policy on the increase of sex ratios in China. Based on the 
Chinese population census in 1990，we find that the one-child policy has indeed 
played a dominant role in the increase of sex ratios in China. The estimated effect 
on the probability of being a boy is as large as 1.01 percentage points for the post-
treatment cohort, which implies that the strict enforcement of the one-child policy 
has causally increased the sex ratio by 4.4, and 93.62% of the increase of the sex ratio 
for the Han Chinese in the entire 1980s can be accounted by the implementation of 
this policy. Further exploration reveals that the policy effect is mainly driven by 
rural residents, and the second and higher birth parities. In addition, the sensitivity 
analysis indicates that our DD estimates are not likely to be confounded with the 
rural household responsibility system reform, the availability and spread of modern 
gender selection technologies, and the epidemic of hepatitis B. 
Although the unbalanced sex ratio at birth has been addressed in the recent 
two Chinese Government Reports, a great deal of effort has been devoted on the 
prohibition of the illegal identification of the fetus' gender. A draft bill has even been 
presented to the nineteenth session of the tenth conference of the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, the highest legislative body of China, that the illegal 
identification of sex by ultrasound B or other apparatus could take a criminal liability 
with a maximum imprisonment of three years in 2005.33 However, this chapter 
^^http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/home/index.jsp (accessed, 25 April, 2007). 
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has demonstrated that the principal culprit of the sex ratios imbalance in China 
is the government's population policy, and the selection of the fetus' identification 
technique is just the individual's constrained optimal behavior under the one-child 
policy regime. Therefore, the Chinese government should reconsider the continuation 




The Effect of Sex Ratios 
Imbalance on Criminal Behavior 
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2.1 Introduction 
The sex ratio at birth, defined as the number of men per 100 women in the reference 
population, has increased from 108.5 in 1981，to 113.8 in 1990 and to 119.9 in 2000, in 
the recent three waves of Chinese population censuses (NBS, 2002). It is believed that 
the increase of the sex ratio could benefit females by decreasing female labor supply 
(Angrist, 2002), decreasing dowries or increasing bride prices (Rao, 1993), increasing 
girl's educational attainment (Becker, 2007), and enhancing female bargaining power 
within the household (Chiappori et al., 2002). In this supply and demand analysis on 
males and females, it is also suggested that the sex ratios imbalance towards males 
could act as a mechanism to mitigate the gender discrimination problem, and the 
sex ratio at birth would be very close to, if not necessarily within, the biologically 
stable range of 103 to 107 in the long run (Becker, 2007). 
However, this chapter would like to argue that there exists at least one negative 
externality of the substantial and sustained high sex ratios. It is the increase of the 
crime rate, which could impair not only the benefit of males but also the welfare of 
the population as a whole. Prom 1988 to 2004，the sex ratio of the cohort aged from 
16 to 25, which is the most crime prone and have constituted over 70% of the total 
criminal offenders after the mid-1980s in China (Hu, 2006)，has steadily increased 
from 104 to 109. Interestingly, during the same period, the annual growth rates 
of the total number of criminal offences and the number of criminal offences per 
10,000 population in China have unprecedently reached 13.6% and 12.5%, respec-
tively. Crime has become a major social and economic issue in China. Hence, the 
identification of the causality between the sex ratio and the crime rate is the issue 
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addressed in the present paper. 
In fact, the positive correlation between the sex ratio and the crime rate had 
been observed in many developing countries, especially in Eastern and Southern Asia 
(Dreze and Khera, 2000; Mitra, 1992; Oldenburg, 1992). In addition, Hudson and 
den Boer (2005) even suggested that "this surplus male population in Asia's largest 
countries threatens domestic stability and international security, and the prospects 
for peace and democracy are dimmed by the growth of bare branches (unmarried 
males) in China and India". However, the establishment of causality between the sex 
ratio and the crime rate is weak, just as Dreze and Khera (2000) said "The notion 
of a direct causal influence of the female-male ratio on the murder rate has some 
intuitive appeal, but is difficult to formalize". To fill this blank, this chapter tries to 
formulate the mechanism by which high sex ratios increase crime rates at first, and 
then empirically examines the causal effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal 
behavior. 
By definition, the most straightforward way that high sex ratios increase crime 
rates is the plain male-female composition effect, because men are far more prone 
to commit crime than women, which is a universal agreement among criminolo-
gists (e.g., Hurwitz and Smithey, 1998; Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996). Hence, the 
population with a higher sex ratio naturally has a higher crime rate. The second 
mechanism that high sex ratios increase crime rates is through the change of the 
marriage status composition. Since the increase of sex ratios not only enhances the 
. male-female ratio, but also increases the single-married ratio, the increased males are 
then disproportional towards the single men. Considering the crime deterrence effect 
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of marriage (Sampson et al , 2006), the marriage status composition effect reinforces 
the simple male-female composition effect. 
The underlying assumption for the analysis of demographic composition effects 
above, both the male-female and single-married composition effects, is that the de-
mographic groups' specific crime rates remain constant. However, the increase of sex 
ratios could also increase men's specific crime rates, especially for single men, which 
would further reinforce the plain male-female composition effect. The underlying 
intuition is also straightforward. The high sex ratio will make the marriage market 
more competitive and then enhance the marriage threshold for men (Angrist, 2002; 
Chiappori et al., 2002). Thus, the increase of the marriage threshold, represented by 
both the increase of bride prices and more investments in characteristics attractive to 
mates, will impose a negative income effect on the time allocated to illegal activities 
in a standard crime model (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), and thus drive up the equi-
librium point of crime rates for men. In other words, a higher sex ratio means that 
the marriage market becomes more competitive for men, and this situation could 
raise the return to crime. 
Empirical studies of the socioeconomic consequences of the sex ratios imbalance, 
however, must contend with the facts that the human sex ratio at birth is biologically 
stable, which is ranged from 103 to 107, and that the population sex ratio is close 
to 100，which results from a higher male mortality rate. Therefore, any substantial 
deviation of the sex ratio from this biologically stable range could result from other 
cultural, social or economic factors, which may be unobservable to researchers. In 
addition, these factors, which may be correlated with sex ratios, could also exert 
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direct or indirect influences on the individual's criminal behavior. Therefore, the 
traditional OLS estimates of the effect of the sex ratio on crime rates may suffer 
from endogeneity problems. 
For example, Edlund (1999) had modeled the unbalanced sex ratio as an en-
dogenous consequence of son preference, which has been rooted in the patriarchy 
tradition. Patriarchal societies, suggested by Dreze and Khera (2000), are often as-
sociated with violence, since they intrinsically rely on violence to the subjugation of 
women. Based on a cross sectional data set, Dreze and Khera then attributed the 
observed positive correlation between sex ratios and crime rates to the unobservable 
variable of patriarchy. In another closely related research, Mitra (1993) hypothesized 
that the significant correlation between sex ratios and violence originated from the 
higher value of sons as a protection against illegal activities than daughters. Hence, 
Mitra concluded that the causality may run from the crime rate to sex ratios, and 
the observed correlation between sex ratios and crime rates was then a "spurious" 
result. 
To deal with the endogeneity problems arising from omitted variables and simul-
taneity mentioned above, we construct a panel data set of 27 provinces over 17 years 
in China. Hence, those time-invariant heterogeneities across provinces and time-
variant socioeconomic factors common to all provinces are cleared out at first by the 
implementation of the province- and year-fixed effects model. We then employ the 
timings of four specific Chinese family planning programs as instruments to identify 
the causal effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior. 
The justification of the validity of instruments lies in the fact that the recent 
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rapid increase of sex ratios in China largely results from the conflict between the 
surviving traditional son preference and the strictly implemented one-child policy. 
When the preferred family size is bound by the one-child policy, parents would more 
heavily rely on gender control technology, such as prenatal gender determination, 
female infanticide, and abandonment, to achieve their desired gender composition of 
children than before (Zeng et al., 1993; Miller, 2001; Yang and Chen, 2004; Chu, 
2001; Li, 2002; Ebenstein, 2007; Gupta, 2005). Thus, the variation of sex ratios 
across different provinces and different periods are determined to a large extent by 
the timing of the implementation of the family planning program. 
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, our empirical results suggest that a 1% 
increase of sex ratios significantly increase the crime rate by 7-10% after controlling 
for the province- and year-fixed effects, which are robust to alternative specifications 
controlling a large number of socioeconomic variables and in a series of sensitivity 
tests. Because the magnitude of the estimated elasticity exceeds the upper bound 
of the elasticity of crime rates with respect to sex ratios when only the male-female 
and single-married composition effects are considered, which is the ratio of the total 
number of males to unmarried males, ^  we conclude that the effect of the sex ratios 
imbalance on crime rates is not only through the demographic composition effects, 
but also through the marriage threshold effect. Therefore, the increase of sex ratios 
has indeed changed the demographic groups' specific crime rates. 
Before proceeding, we should note that there is another class of literature that 
finds high sex ratios decrease crime rates (Messner and Sampson, 1991; Barber, 2000; 
iThis will be demonstrated in the following section. 
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Posner, 1992). Posner (2007) even cited the "low effective male-female sex ratio of 
the black population in the US" as a cause for the promotion of promiscuity in the 
black population, and further justifies his conclusion that "In sum, sex selection, at 
least in favor of males, appears not to have negative external effects". The mechanism 
suggested by Messner and Sampson, and Posner is that the "marriage squeeze" for 
females, which is induced by the decrease of sex ratios below the balanced range, will 
reduce the probability of family formation and result in marital instability. Hence, 
the positive effect of the family disruption on the crime may dominate the negative 
effect of the decrease of males. 
Could this negative relationship between the sex ratio and crime rate below the 
natural range be extrapolated to the upper range? Probably not. Following the 
same logic, the "marriage squeeze" for males may also lead to marital instability. 
Moreover, the increase of males, especially those unmarried ones who are the riskiest 
group in a society, will increase the crime rate further. Take the biological stable 
range as a reference point. The deviation of the sex ratio to lower levels, i.e., less 
males, could result in two opposite effects on the crime rate: the positive effect of 
marital instability and the negative effect of the decrease of males. But the negative 
effect of the decrease of males is found to be dominated by the positive effect of 
marital instability. On the other hand, when the sex ratio deviates to higher levels, 
there are two positive effects on the crime rate. One is the decrease of the probability 
of family formation, and the other is the increase of males. Then the deviation of the 
sex ratio towards males appears to have a larger positive effect on crime rates than 
the deviation towards females. Therefore, the relationship between the sex ratio and 
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the crime rate could be like an asymmetric "U" shape. 
In fact, the differences of the mean values of sex ratios in these two classes of 
literature could just support this "U" story. On the one hand, the mean values of 
sex ratios in Messner and Sampson's (1992) sample are 95 for the total population, 
and 91.5 and 98.2 for the black and white population in the US, respectively; and 
the mean value in Barber's (2002) cross country analysis is 98.6. On the other hand, 
the mean values of the sex ratio in Dreze and Khera (2000)，Oldenburg (1992), and 
Mitra (1993), are all higher than 107，and it is 106 in the present paper. Therefore, 
the "increase" of sex ratios considered in the former class of literature is restoring 
from the lower levels of deviation to its natural range; while the "increase" of sex 
ratios discussed in the later class of literature is deviating from its natural range 
to higher levels. Considering the fact that the sex ratio is exceptionally high in 
Asian countries, which are the focus of our empirical analysis, the case of sex ratios 
imbalance considered in this chapter is the sex ratio biased from its biologically stable 
range to higher levels, i.e., the right side of this hypothesized "U". 
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 derives the mecha-
nism by which high sex ratios increase crime rates. Section 3 specifies the em-
pirical strategy and introduces the data set. Section 4 reports the empirical re-
sults and Section 5 conducts the robust analysis. Section 6 concludes this chapter. 
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2.2 The Mechanism by which High Sex Ratios In-
crease Crime Rates 
This section presents a simple model to formulate the mechanism by which high 
sex ratios increase crime rates. We categorize the population into four demographic 
groups: unmarried males mP (measured by the ratio of unmarried males to the total 
population), unmarried females 八 married males and married females p ; and 
denote their specific crime rates to be c^, c j , 心 and cj, respectively. The crime 
rate of the whole population, c, can then be decomposed as the weighted average of 
the four demographic specific crime rates, 
c = + + (2.1) 
We make the following assumptions: 
> 4，> 4； 4 > cL cj > c}. (2.2) 
The first two inequalities state that males are more prone to commit crime than 
females (e.g., Hurwitz and Smithey, 1998; Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996). For ex-
ample, the arrest rate for males is 4.34 times as that for females in the US in 1990， 
and there are 9211 arrests per 100,000 persons for males and 2122 arrests for females, 
respectively. In some violence and property offence cases, the female percentage of 
arrests is even lower (Uniform Crime Reports, 1990). In China, the difference of 
arrest rates between males and females is even higher than in the US, and the male 
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arrest rate is 8.23 times as that for females {Law Yearbook of China, 2001). The last 
two inequalities state that marriage has some deterring effect on criminal activities. 
Recently, Sampson et a l , (2006) derived from experimental evidence that marriage 
will decrease the probability of committing crime by 35 percentage points for young 
men. Therefore, the unmarried young men are the riskiest group in this demographic 
classification. 
In the following part of this section, the mechanism of the effect of the sex ratios 
imbalance on criminal behavior will be derived in two steps. In the first step, we 
assume that the sex ratios imbalance only influences the relative proportion of the 
demographic groups, m。’ /。，m}, and which leads to the change of c; while 
their specific crime rates, c^, cj, c二，and c}•，are assumed to be constant or change 
randomly which are uncorrelated with the change of m^, and / i . In the 
second step, we explore the mechanism that the change of the relative proportion of 
the four demographic groups will lead to the change of their specific crime rates, c^, 
心 and cj•’ focusing on the change of the crime rate for males, which reinforces 
the demographic composition effect derived in the first step. 
2.2.1 Demographic Composition Effect 
In the simplest case, the crime rate, c, is decomposed as the population weighted 
average of the male crime rate, c^, and the female crime rate, c/， 
c = CmTn + Cff = Cmm + C/(1 - m), (2.3) 
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in which, 
= … 0 + 心 二 , + (2.4) 
771 J 
and the sex ratio，r, is defined as the ratio of males to females 
今 T ^ . (2.5) 
To begin with, we assume that the change of sex ratios r has no effect on Cm and c/. 
Hence the increase of sex ratios will increase the crime rate of the total population 
plainly through the male-female composition, because men are far more prone to 
commit crime than women, i.e., Cm > Cf. 
However, if the gender specific crime rates are uncorrelated with the male-female 
ratio, the upper bound for the elasticity of c with respect to r is the ratio of females 
to the total population. Specifically, from Expression (3) above, the elasticity of the 
crime rate with respect to the sex ratio, when only the plain male-female composition 
effect is taken into account, can be expressed as 
dc m dm r 
一 CmTn - CfTTl 
CmTn + C/(1 - m) 
< f. (2.6) 
Hence, if the estimated elasticity of crime rate c with respect to r is larger than the 
ratio of the females to the total population, then the plain male-female composition 
55 
effect cannot explain all the estimated effect of sex ratios on crime rates. 
The same logic can be applied to the case when both the plain male-female 
and single-married composition effects are accounted for. Since the case that this 
chapter considers is that the sex ratio is biased towards males, the increase of sex 
ratios means that more men cannot be married and this is due to the absence of 
females. Thus, an increase of the sex ratio r will not only increase m, but also 
change the demographic composition of m, i.e., increase the share of unmarried males 
in m. Since the disproportionate increase of unmarried males m^ will undoubtedly 
increase Cm in the first equation of Expression (4) (c^ > c^), the effect of the sex 
ratios imbalance on criminal behavior is larger when both the male-female and single-
married composition effects are taken into account than in the case when only the 
former effect is considered. 
Although the marriage status composition effect can account for the additional 
effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior in addition to the plain male-
female composition effect to a certain extent, the magnitude may be modest. In 
fact, the upper bound of the elasticity of the crime rate with respect to the sex ratio 
when both the male-female and single-married composition effects are taken into 
account should be the ratio of the total number of males to unmarried males. A 
simple calculation will make it clear 
, 、 ,dc mP. ,dmP r , 
如 ） = 
,dc mP. m < ( •——)•—— 




The assumption underlying in the equality of the first step in the expression above 
is that the increase of the sex ratio is solely attributed to the increase of the share 
of unmarried males. Then the inequality of the second step is due to the fact that 
mP = r f - m} and ^ < 譬 . T h e final inequality can be derived by applying the 
same logic as in Expression (6) and 為•竿 < 1. Therefore, the elasticity of the 
crime rate with respect to the sex ratio should be less than the ratio of total number 
of males over unmarried males. 
Although Expression (7) does set an upper bound for the elasticity of the crime 
rate with respect to the sex ratio, the calculation of the ratio of men over unmarried 
men, m/m°, seems quite sensitive to what ages are included. It is obvious that m/m° 
is positively related to the age cutoff, because the share of unmarried men to the total 
number of men is decreasing with age. The justification of the age cutoff should also 
be based on the fact that men older than this age could be potential participants in 
both the marriage market and crime market. According to the Chinese population 
census in 2000, m/mP is 3.17, 5.56，and 6.89，when the age cutoff is set at 16, 18, and 
20，respectively. Considering the fact that the age of 18 is regarded as the threshold 
to adulthood in Chinese tradition, and that the age of 16 is the prescribed minimum 
age bearing full criminal responsibility, the age cutoff of 18 is regarded as the baseline 
for the calculation of m/mP. Even so, the interpretation of the estimated elasticity 
of the crime rate with respect to the sex ratio should be carefully treated in the next 
section. 
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2.2.2 Marriage Threshold Effect 
The underlying assumption for the analysis in the previous subsection is that the 
change of sex ratio only influences the demographic composition, while the demo-
graphic groups' specific crime rates remain constant. In this case, the effect of sex 
ratios imbalance on crime rates is through the increase of the proportion of the high-
est crime prone group, unmarried young men. However, just as the simple calculation 
presented above illustrates, the demographic composition effect cannot account for 
all the effect of sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior if the estimated elasticity 
of the crime rate with respect to the sex ratio is larger than the ratio of the total 
number of males to the unmarried males. Hence, this subsection formulates the 
idea that the change of demographic structure also affects the demographic group's 
specific crime rates, focused on the crime rates for the riskiest group, the unmarried 
males. 
In a standard time allocation model of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973, 1977), 
the individual equates the marginal income from illegal activities with the marginal 
income from the labor market and other legal activities to maximize the utility 
function. In what follows, we extend this basic framework to derive the positive effect 
of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior for those unmarried men. Consider 
an unmarried male who choosing how much time to spend on illegal activities. Denote 
t to be the time spent on illegal activities, b the probability of arrest, and A the 
endowed wealth or nonlabor income. If the individual is arrested (with probability 
6), on the one hand, the income is 1^ = A + G{t) - F{t), where G{t) is the net gains 
from illegal activities, and F{t) represents the monetary equivalent of any sanctions. 
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On the other hand, if the individual is successful in illegal activities (with probability 
1 — 6), the income is then I2 = A + G{t). 
The novelty with the present crime model is the introduction of the probability 
of marriage, which is determined by the following four elements. Firstly, the wealth 
X{r) preconditions for an unmarried man to make a proposal to a girl, which is 
named as "marriage threshold". The marriage threshold could be justified by both 
the bride price and the investment on characteristics attractive to mates, and it is 
assumed to be an increasing function of the sex ratio r. Secondly, the probability of 
getting married is assumed to be an increasing function of the income, I , when the 
precondition of marriage threshold is satisfied. Thirdly, the probability of marriage 
is zero in the case of being arrested. Finally, the probability of getting married is 
also influenced by an stochastic variable £ in the marriage market, which follows the 
standard normal distribution. 
Denoting <l> to be the accumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
distribution 1)，and (f) the corresponding density distribution function; then the 
probability of getting married P can be expressed as 
P = PlA + G(t) + £>X(r)j 
= — G ⑴]. (2.8) 
In addition, if an individual is married, the income then is /i 二 A + G(t) + M; M is 
the gains from marriage, which can be justified by the division of labor in household, 
scale effect, or assortative mating effect (Becker, 1991). 
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The individual is assumed to have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 
t/(/), where I is the income level. Thus, the unmarried male's expected utility is 
EU = (1一6)户[/(/1) + (1-6)(1-尸)/7(/2) + 6[/(/3) (2.9) 
= ( 1 - 6){(1 - ^)U\A + M + G⑴]+ ^U[A + G⑴]} + hU[A + G{t) — F⑴]. 
The individual chooses t to maximize the expected utility EU, subjected to 0 < 
t <T, where T is the endowed time constraint. In the case of interior solution, the 
first-order condition (FOC) with respect to t should be 
Di = (1 - 6){0G"(O[t/(/i) - U(l2)] + (1 - m ' { h ) G ' ( t ) + m\l2)G'it)} 
= 0 . (2 .10) 
The FOC can be rewritten as 
(1 - b)WU{h) - ujh)] + (1 - m'ih) + 少 G ' j t ) - F'jt) 
= W ) . ( ) 
The formula above states that, at the optimum of the time devoted to illegal activities 
t, the marginal rate of substitution in incomes between failure and success should be 
equal to the marginal rate of transformation in gains from illegal activities. To ensure 
the equality, the net marginal return to illegal activities should be negative, i.e., 
G'{t) — F'{t) < 0, at the optimum. In other words, the marginal rate of punishments 
has to be made to exceed that of the benefits from criminal offences in the equilibrium 
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point. Then the second order condition is 
Dn 二 （1 - b){<j>G'\t)[U{h) — U{l2)][X(r)-A-G(t)] + ^G"it)lUih) — [/(I2)] 
⑴ + (：/⑴][t/'⑷-[/'(/2)j 
+(1 - ^>)[t/〃(/i)G'2(i) + 〃⑴]+ $[[/〃(/2)G'2⑴ + [/'(/2)G〃⑴]} 
+6{C/〃(/3)[G'⑴-⑴]2 + t/'(/3)[G〃⑴-F〃⑴]} 
< 0. (2 .12) 
Besides the conventional assumptions: risk aversion U" < 0，decreasing marginal 
returns to illegal activities G" < 0，and non-decreasing marginal penalty F" > 0， 
one more condition should be imposed, i.e., X{r) — A — G{t) < 0 at the optimal 
choice of t, to ensure the second order condition. In fact, this additional restriction 
is a natural extension in the case of the incorporation of marriage probability in 
the crime model. It states that the expected income at the optimal choice of t in 
the case of not being arrested should be no less than the marriage threshold, i.e., 
E[A + G{t) + e] > X[r). Otherwise, the marriage provides little incentive for the 
individual and no one would be married in this case, since the marriage threshold 
is so high that even the expected income in the successful case still cannot reach it. 
Therefore, we only consider the case of E[A 4- G{t) +e] > X{r) at the optimum. 
Then we consider the effect of sex ratios imbalance on the optimal time allocating 
to illegal activities, t. Applying the implicit theorem to the FOC (10), we get the 
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following comparative statics 
色 _ dPi/dr 
d^ — Dn 
= ( 1 - b)cl>[Xir)-A-G{t)]X'(r) + (1 - b)小 G'(t)X'(r)lU'(h) - U'jh)] 
> 0. (2.13) 
Expression (13) states that the sign of dt/dr depends on the X'(r) and U'(Ji)-U'[l2). 
Firstly, the sign of U'{Ii) - U'(I2) is just determined by the individual's preference 
towards risk, U". Applying the conventional assumption of risk aversion U" < 0, 
then U'{Ii) — U'{l2) should be negative for Ii > I2. Secondly, X'(r) > 0 states 
that men need to be more efficient, i.e., to invest more on his own attractiveness, 
or that just a higher bride price is required, in a more competitive marriage market 
faced by them, which is induced by the imbalance of sex ratios towards males. Since 
the effect of the increase of sex ratios on crime rates is through the increase of the 
marriage threshold in this case, we name this effect as "marriage threshold effect". 
The intuition of this effect coincides with Zhang's (1997) welfare program effect on 
criminal behavior. The marriage gain is similar to a welfare payment, the increase of 
sex ratios and then the increase of marriage threshold in fact reduces the expected 
income at the original optimal choice of t, resulting in a negative income effect on the 
individual's criminal behavior. In the standard crime model (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 
1973; Zhang, 1997), thus, the negative income effect induces the individual to allocate 
more time to illegal activities. 
In the simplest model presented above, however, we have assumed that the prob-
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ability of arrest, b, is constant, and only considered the case of the allocation of time 
on illegal activities. If b is assumed to be an increasing function of the time allocating 
on illegal activities, i.e., b = b{t) and b'{t) > 0，and the states of employment and 
unemployment, and then the time allocation between legal and illegal activities, are 
also included, then the results are qualitatively the same in this more general model 
as in the simple one. Since the algebra is notoriously miscellaneous and lengthy, we 
do not present here. However, the unequivocal positive sign of the effect of the sex 
ratio on the time allocated to illegal activities still holds. 
So far, we have only discussed the marriage threshold effect of sex ratios imbalance 
on criminal behavior for unmarried males, i.e., dc^/dr in Eq.(l), Can this kind 
of marriage threshold effect still unequivocally hold for the whole population, i.e., 
whether the sign of dc/dr is positive? The answer would be affirmative. On the 
one hand, if we only regard X{r) as the investment on characteristics attractive to 
mates (Angrist, 2002)，the increase of the sex ratio will only exert a negative income 
effect on both unmarried males and married males when the case of illegal marriage 
or extra-marital affairs is taken into account, since the imbalance of sex ratios will 
also raise the marriage threshold for a second wife as well. Hence, the increase of 
sex ratios will drive up male's crime rate Cm as a whole, while the female's specific 
crime rate c/ should remain constant. 
On the other hand, the scenario becomes a little more complicated when X(r) is 
regarded as a bride price, because the increase of r acts like an income transfer from 
males to females (Rao, 1993). Hence, dcm/dr would be positive, while dcf/dr would 
be negative. Based on the empirical evidence from Zhang's (1997) analysis of the 
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effect of welfare program on criminal behavior, however, we still consider that the 
negative effect on females will be dominated by the positive effect on males. Zhang 
(1997) has empirically demonstrated that the more general programs available to 
both men and women had a significantly larger effect than those aimed primarily 
at women on the crime rate. In reality, we consider that the increase of the sex 
ratio will increase the marriage threshold, X{r), through both the bride price and 
the investment on individual's own attractiveness. Hence, the aggregate "marriage 
threshold" effect of the sex ratios imbalance on crime rates could still be assumed to 
be positive at the population level. 
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Data Description 
In order to implement the estimation of the effect of the sex ratios imbalance on 
criminal behavior discussed in the previous section, we incorporate a sex ratio vari-
able into the conventional crime equation (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Cornwell 
and Trumbull, 1994; Zhang, 1997)，specify the empirical strategy to deal with the 
endogeneity problem of the sex ratio at first, and then introduce the provincial level 
data from China in this section. 
2.3.1 Empirical strategy 
Although it would be desirable to test the theoretical prediction of the positive 
effect of the sex ratios imbalance on illegal participation on individual data, as in 
most empirical studies of crime, aggregate data may have their own appealings, 
64 
because reliable individual data on criminal activity would be difficult to obtain and 
the quality of self-reported data on crime may be suspect (Heineke, 1988). As a 
result, variables entering the crime equation are at the aggregate level. Extending 
the justification of the aggregate function of crime supply to incorporate the marriage 
threshold effect (Ehrlich, 1973，p. 534), the aggregate supply curve of offenses can 
be conceived of as a joint cumulative distribution of three density functions showing 
variations across persons with respect to the minimum expected net gains from the 
labor market, crime market, and marriage market, which are sufficient to induce 
them to enter an illegal activity. Therefore, the extent of response of active offenders 
to changes in these net gains originates not only from the labor market and crime 
market, but also from the marriage market. Just as in the discussion of Ehrlich 
(1996) and Freeman (1994, 1996), in which the surge of crime rates from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s in the US is attributed to the deterioration of the labor 
market for unskilled young men, the deterioration of the marriage market for males, 
which is due to the scarcity of available females, will produce similar temptation on 
them to engage in illegal activities. 
Using a panel data set from China at the provincial level, we specify the following 
semi-log regression equation: 
Ln丑it 二 + + + Yt + eit’ i = l,...，iV; t = l,…,T, (2.14) 
where Rn is the crime rate, Su is the sex ratio defined as the number of males 
to per 100 females in the reference group, Xu is a vector that contains variables 
controlling for the relative return to legal opportunities and deterrent effects; and 
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the subscript i indexes province and t indicates year. As discussed in the previous 
section, the predicted sign of the coefficient before the sex ratio, a, is positive. 
Following conventional practice (Levitt, 1998), the variable 6i denotes provincial 
dummies capturing the unobservable province-specific heterogeneities, Yt are year 
dummies capturing the time variations on the crime common to all provinces. The 
residual eu is the typical disturbance term, assumed to be i.i.d with a zero mean and 
constant variance.^ 
Both the provincial dummies 6i and year dummies Yt may be correlated with both 
Sit and Rit simultaneously. Hence, neglecting the unobserved provincial heterogene-
ity Si will lead to a biased estimate of the effect of the sex ratios imbalance on the 
crime rate in Eq.(14). One example of this unobserved provincial heterogeneity is 
advanced by Dreze and Khera (2000). Based on the cross section data at the regional 
level in India, Dreze and Khera found that the estimated elasticity of the murder 
rate with respect to the sex ratio is larger than 8 at a significance level of 1% in all 
specifications. Due to the inability of controlling for the regional heterogeneities in 
their cross section data, however, they attributed this observed positive correlation 
between sex ratios and crime rates to an unobservable variable of patriarchy. 
Although both the time-invariant heterogeneity across provinces and the time-
variant socioeconomic factors common to all provinces could be filtered out in the 
province- and year-fixed effects model of Eq.(14), those unobserved time-variant 
and province-variant factors cannot be controlled for in this fixed effects model. 
If this kind of factor is correlated with sex ratios and crime rates simultaneously, 
2In our empirical estimation in the next section, we also specify Yt as a time trend as a robust 
test. 
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our fixed effects estimates may suffer from the endogeneity problem arising from 
omitted variables. Another concern with the validity of the fixed effects estimate is 
the potential simultaneity between the sex ratio and the crime rate. As suggested by 
Oldenburg (1993) and Mitra (1993), parents living in regions with higher crime rates 
may have a higher demand for sons, because sons have a higher value as a protection 
against illegal activities than daughters. Therefore, the fixed effects instrumental 
variables (FE-IV) estimator is used to identify the causal effect of the sex ratios 
imbalance on criminal behavior, in which the sex ratio is instrumented by the timing 
of the Chinese family planning program beginning as early as the 1970s. 
2.3.2 Data Description 
We employ the Chinese provincial level data during the period from 1988 to 2004 
for the empirical test.3 The benefits of the use of Chinese data extend to several 
dimensions. Firstly, the use of data from one country can avoid the problem of 
different statistical methods in different countries, to a large extent, and the great 
divergence of the legal system and crime definitions across different countries, even 
across different states in a certain country. In China, only the National People's 
Congress (NPC) with its permanent body, the Standing Committee of the NPC, 
exercises the legislative power of the state; and the measures of criminal offences 
are consistently defined across provinces.4 Secondly, the Chinese data set exhibits 
3 The data set consists only of 27 provinces in China, because the four municipalities directly 
under the ccntral government, i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqin, are dropped for the 
different judiciary system and different fertility policy (Peng, 1996). 
4Art. 58’ The Constitution Law of the People's Republic of China. In addition, Wang and Mo 
(1999) and Chow (2003) give an thorough introduction of Chinese Law and Legal system. 
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considerable variations in both crime rates and sex ratios not only along the time 
trend, but also across provinces. In fact, the drastic and uneven increase of sex ratios 
during the past three decades has become an aggravating socioeconomic problem in 
China, which had been heavily addressed in the two recent documents of Report on 
the Work of the Government^ Lastly but most importantly, the causal relationship 
between the strict enforcement of the Chinese family planning program and the 
increase of the sex ratio serves as a precious opportunity, if not a unique one, to 
identify the causal effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior. 
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for variables in the crime equation; Appendix 
I lists the definitions and data sources for the variables. Data on the crime rate 
come from the China Law Yearbook (Supreme People's Court, 1989-2005) and the 
Procuratorial Yearbook of China (Supreme People's Procuratorate, 1989-2005), and 
the variable of crime rates is defined as the number of people being arrested per 
10,000 populations for both violence offences and property offences. The data set 
shows that in China, the crime rate has almost doubled from 3.71 in 1988 to 6.77 
in 2004，and exhibits a considerable heterogeneity across provinces, in which Tibet 
experienced the lowest crime rate of 0.81 in 1988, while Zhejiang had the highest 
crime rate of 13.1 in 2004. 
One deficiency of our data set of crime rates is that we cannot make the classifica-
tion between violent offences and property offences. However, just as the argument 
advanced by Fajnzylber and Lederman (2002) illustrates, the violent offences can 
5In the Report on the Work of the Government in 2006, Wen, the Premier of the Chinese State 
Council, stated "to take effective steps to correct the gender imbalance in newborns"; and in the 
2007 Report, he further promised "to take a full range of measures to address the gender imbalance 
in babies" in China {Report on the Work of the Government, 2006, 2007). 
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also be committed for profit-seeking motives. Thus, the classification of the motives 
between violent crimes and property crimes is not so dichotomous. In fact, property 
offences consist of a dominating share of the total criminal cases across the whole 
nation, and the ratio of the number of property offences to the total number of 
criminal cases has ranged from 77.3% to 90.7% during the period of 1981-2004. In 
property offences, larceny ranks first place and on the average takes up 86.7% during 
the same period (Hu, 2006). In order to check the robustness of the construction 
of the criminal arrests as crime rates, the number of defendants under public pros-
ecution for violence and property offences per 10,000 population is also used as an 
alternative measure for the criminal activities in the sensitivity analysis. 
Data on the sex ratio come from the projection of the Chinese population cen-
sus in 1990, and the variable of sex ratios is proxied by the number of males per 
100 females aged from 16 to 25，The data set shows that the sex ratio had not 
only steadily increased from 104 in 1988 to 109 in 2004 for this age cohort, but 
also exhibited a great divergence across provinces. Guangdong and Hainan had the 
highest sex ratio of 113 in 2003 and 2004, while Tibet had the lowest sex ratio of 98 
in 1991. However, the projected variable of sex ratios involves measurement errors. 
The sources of measurement errors come from different gender mortality patterns 
6 The selection of the age cohort of 16-25 is based on the following considerations: (i) 16 is 
the proscribed lowest age of taking full criminal responsibility (Article 17’ the Criminal Law of 
the People's Republic of China)] (ii) 25 is the upper age for the research on the "juvenile crime" 
according to the Chinese practice in criminology and the definition by the Chinese Juvenile Crime 
Research Association (http:// www.sociology.cass.cn/shxs, accessed, 25 April, 2007); (iii) this age 
cohort is the most crime prone one, and constitutes over 70% of the total number of criminal 
offenders after the mid-1980s in China. For example, the share of homicide, rape, robbery, and 
larccny committed by this age cohort are 46.73%, 55.31%, 78.77%, and 66.16% in 1993，respectively 
(Hu, 2006). 
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and inter-province migration, which could make the projected sex ratio differ from 
the correctly-measured sex ratio. 
On the one hand, while it should be admitted the existence of different gender 
mortality patterns, this difference is concentrated during infancy and old age. How-
ever, the age range in our projection is from 2 to 27 in the 1990 population census, 
and the variable of sex ratios is defined over a 10-year age bracket. In addition, 
the different gender mortality patterns would not likely be correlated with crime 
rates, though it is directly correlated with sex ratios. Although the cross provincial 
migration could be correlated with the measurement error and the crime rate simul-
taneously, on the other hand, we will try to control the inter-province migration in 
the regression equation. In any case, to deal with problems arising from measure-
ment errors, we not only employ the fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) 
estimator, but also use an alternative measure of the sex ratio by the projection of 
the Chinese population census in 1982 as a robust test. 
Following the standard crime model and the mechanism discussed in the previous 
section, other socioeconomic variables in Xu in Eq.(14) are per capita income, income 
inequality, urbanization rate, unemployment rate, welfare expenditure, migration, 
and police expenditure, which come from the Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials on 55 Years of New China (NBS, 2005), and various issues of the China 
Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 1989-2005). In addition, as an analysis of the age profile 
of criminals, the population size for the age cohort of 16-25 is also controlled in the 
regression as a robust test. Appendix I lists the description and data sources of these 
control variables in detail. 
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As discussed in the conventional specification of a crime model (Ehrlich, 1973; 
Kelly, 2000; Bourguignon, 1999), income inequality could be proxied as the difference 
between the potential gains from crime and the associated opportunity cost. Hence, 
a rise in income inequality would unambiguously increase crime rates. Similarly, per 
capita income might also have a positive effect on crime rates, because it acts as a 
"scale effect" on the absolute value of the relative distance between legitimate and 
illegitimate opportunities, and then increase the expected gains from illegal activities. 
However, per capita income could also be represented as a pure income as A in Eq. (9), 
and the increases of per capita income could then have a negative effect on the crime 
rate if the criminal activity is conceived as an inferior good. Therefore, the net effect 
of income on crime would be ambiguous. The other three variables, urbanization 
rate, unemployment rate, and welfare expenditure, are proxied as the population 
density, the probability of getting a legitimate job, and the welfare payment received. 
Following conventional practice, the former two variables of urbanization rates and 
unemployment rates are predicted to be positively related to the crime rate, and the 
welfare expenditure is assumed to be negatively correlated with crime rates (Zhang, 
1997). 
Since the increase of the police expenditure could raise the probability of being 
arrested, b, in Eq.(9), and the decrease the expected gains from a criminal activity, 
the traditional crime model (Becker, 1968) predicts a negative effect of the policy 
expenditure on crime rates. However, the standard OLS estimate may be biased 
by a simultaneous relationship between the police expenditure and crime rates. In 
other words, higher crime rates will increase the marginal productivity of the policy, 
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and then induce more police expenditure. Since the variable in the crime equation 
of our primary interest in the present paper is the sex ratio and there is a lack of 
convincing variables to instrument the police expenditure, Eq.(14) will be estimated 
without and with the police expenditure respectively. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
This section systematically tests the effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal 
behavior. We first present the basic results of the fixed effects estimation, then 
empirically verify the validity of instruments and carry out the results of the FE-IV 
estimation. 
2.4.1 Fixed Effects Estimation 
To begin, we first carry out the fixed effects estimation of Eq.(14). Table 2 reports 
the fixed effects estimates with the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. After 
controlling for the province- and time-fixed effects, Column (1) reports the regression 
of Eq.(14) with the sex ratio as the only independent variable. As expected, the 
coefficient on the sex ratio is positive and statistically significant at a high level of 1%. 
In order to check the robustness of the correlation between the sex ratio and the crime 
rate, we add other socioeconomic variables from Column (2) to Column (5) step by 
step, and replace the time dummies with a time trend in Column (6). Consistent with 
the prediction of our theoretical model, the most striking result is that the estimated 
coefficients on the sex ratio are uniformly positive and statistically significant at a 
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high level in all specifications. In addition, the magnitude and significance of the 
estimated coefficient of the sex ratio are very stable and robust to the inclusion 
of other control variables. It suggests that the estimated effect of the sex ratios 
imbalance is not likely to be confounded with these control variables. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients for income and income inequality are con-
sistently positive in Table 2，and statistically significant at the conventional level 
of 10% in most specifications. These results provide new evidence from developing 
countries in support of the importance of these two variables in explaining the in-
crease of crime rates as found in Ehrlich (1973, 1977). The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the urbanization rate, measured by the percentage of urban 
residents to the total population, may imply that there are more illegitimate earning 
opportunities in urban areas, suggesting that the surge of crime rates in the recent 
two decades in China may partly be attributed to the rapid urbanization process. 
The negative coefficient on the welfare expenditure indicates that the generosity of 
welfare program decreases crime rates, although it is imprecisely estimated in the 
fixed effects model J The inconsistence and insignificance of the estimated coeffi-
cients of the unemployment rate may be due to the imprecise measurement of this 
variable, because it is only defined on the registered unemployed people living in 
urban areas, and the laid off employees in state owned enterprises (SOEs) are also 
7 One deficiency with the variable of welfare expenditure is that the expenditure on retirees 
has also been included, and we cannot make further decomposition of the welfare expenditure 
at the provincial level. Hence, the negative coefficient on the welfare expenditure may capture 
the demographic composition with a relative large ageing population. However, we hope that 
this problem should not be so severe, because the share of the expenditure on retirees has been 
consisted of only a very small part of the totol welfare expenditure. In fact, the average share of 
the expenditure on retirees to the total welfare expenditure is only 13.49% during the period of 
1978-2005 (NSB, 2006). 
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excluded. 
In order to check the robustness of the interested variable of sex ratio projected 
by the 1990 census discussed in the previous section, we include cross provincial 
migration in the regression equation. It is found that the estimated coefficients on 
migration are consistently positive in all specifications. This finding is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction of the standard crime model (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 
1973), because frequent migration could reduce the probability of being caught (6 
in Eq.(9)), and then increase the expected net gains in illegal activities. Comparing 
Columns (3) with (2) in Table 2，however, we find that the magnitude and significance 
of the estimated coefficient of the sex ratio changes little after the inclusion of the 
migration in the fixed effects model. It means that the cross provincial migration 
may have happened randomly with respect to the sex ratio, or the marriage oriented 
cross provincial migration driven by the unbalanced sex ratio is not significant in 
China. 
In addition, we also run regressions by including the cohort size for those aged 
from 16 to 25，and replace the year dummies with a year trend as robust tests, and 
the results are reported in Columns (4) and (6). Although the estimated coefficient 
of the cohort size itself is positive and statistically significant at the level of 1%, 
it is interesting to find that the estimated effect of the sex ratios imbalance on 
crime rates experiences little variation when comparing Columns (4) with (3). The 
robustness of the magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficient on sex ratio 
means that the change of the demographic structure indeed has an effect on criminal 
behavior independent of the scale of the total population. Column (6) reports the 
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fixed effects estimate by replacing year dummies with a year trend. Although the 
estimated effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior is robust to this 
alternative measure of the time effect, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on 
the sex ratio has a notable increase, and the R-square decreases from 0.61 to 0.43 by 
comparing Columns (4) with (6). It means that the time effect on the crime rate is 
less likely to be linear, and then the specification of the time effect as year dummies 
is preferred as in most other crime researches. 
Finally, we discuss the estimated coefficient on the nuisance variable in the struc-
tural model of crime, police expenditure, which may have a simultaneous relation 
with the crime rate (Ehrlich, 1973; Thaler, 1977; Levitt, 1997). Due to the inabil-
ity to find valid instruments for police expenditure in the present paper, we only 
consider the specification with the variable of police expenditure as a robust test. 
By comparing Columns (5) with (4), however, we find that the inclusion of police 
expenditure has little effect on the magnitude of the estimated effect of sex ratios 
imbalance on crime rates, indicating an independent relationship between the sex 
ratio and police expenditure. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient on police 
expenditure is consistent with the "simultaneity" story. 
2.4.2 Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables Estimation 
Although the cross provincial heterogeneities are cleared out in our fixed effects 
model, results of the fixed effects regressions in Table 2 could be still biased by 
those time-varying, province-varying factors which may be correlated with the sex 
ratio, the possible simultaneity between sex ratios and crime rates, and especially 
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the measurement error of the interested explanatory variable of sex ratios. Hence, 
we employ a fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) estimator to identify the 
causal effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior in this subsection. 
Before directly setting into the second stage, we discuss the validity of the IVs and 
conduct the first-stage estimation first. 
Instruments used for the sex ratio are four dummy variables capturing the timing 
of China's various family planning programs or organizations. These programs and 
organizations include the promulgation of the Regulation of Family Planning Trial 
Implementation and of the Complementary Regulation of the One-Child Policy, and 
the establishment of the Family Planning Research Centre and of the Family Plan-
ning Association. What is very useful for our IV estimation is that these programs 
or organizations are put in place in different years across provinces. To see whether 
the program or organizations affect the sex ratio, we check whether the policy was 
in place when an individual was born. Thus, we look at 16 years back in time. The 
reason for the lag in time by 16 years is that the sex ratio is defined on the cohort 
aged from 16 to 25. For example, the sex ratio for this cohort in 1995 in Shan-
dong province depends on whether the policy was promulgated in 1979. Appendix 
II describes the implications of the enactments of the two regulations and the com-
missions for the two family planning organizations. To serve as good instruments 
for the sex ratio, three criteria should be satisfied: (i) the instruments should closely 
relate to the sex ratio; (ii) they need to have enough variation over time and across 
provinces; (iii) the instruments should be exogenous in the crime equation when the 
sex ratio is controlled for. We then discuss the validity of the instruments based on 
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these three criteria in order. 
Firstly, it is widely believed that the strict enforcement of the Chinese popula-
tion control policy has had a profound impact on fertility and other demographic 
behavior, and has been empirically examined by both economists and demographers 
(e.g., Yang and Chen, 2004; Qian, 2006; Li et aL, 2005; Li and Zhang, 2006; Eben-
stein, 2007; Gupta, 2005). Based on a data set from a national fertility survey in 
1992, Yang and Chen (2004) concluded that two forms of gender discrimination: 
(1) sex-based stopping behavior in favor of boys, and (2) sex-selective abortion, girl 
infanticide, abandonment, and neglect of nutrition and health care leading to higher 
female mortality, had been significantly aggravated after the enactment of the fam-
ily planning program, which directly leads to the increase of the sex ratio in China. 
Similarly, based on a structural model of the parents' fertility choice, Ebenstein 
(2007) had identified the one-child policy as the principal explanation for the sex 
ratio distortion in China.® 
Secondly, as Peng (1996) indicates, China's family planning program has demon-
strated considerable variations across provinces from the 1970s to present. In De-
cember of 1988，for example, Peng Peiyun, the then head of the National Family 
Planning Commission, admitted that the adoption of a uniform policy guideline 
8 In fact, a simple calculation will make the relation between the enforcement of the birth control 
policy and the sex ratio clear. Assuming that the "at least one boy" rule is practiccd by the parents, 
there is little need to manipulate the gender composition of the children when the total fertility 
rate is larger than 5 (the average total fertility rate is 5.22 from 1949 to 1979 in China), because the 
probability of having no son is less than 2.5% in this case. However, when the birth rate is regulated 
at 1’ or 2 in some exceptional cases, by the family planning policy, the probability of having no son 
increases to 50% and 25%, respectively. Hence, the parents are forced to perform gender selection 
activities, since the continuation of the family's name is still considered as a responsibility to the 
predecessor, especially in Chinese rural areas. 
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across the whole nation should be inadvisable (Short and Zhai, 1998). Appendix 
III lists the years of the enactments of two policies and of the establishments of two 
organizations, in which the timings of the enactments of family planning policies and 
of the establishments of family planning organizations have exhibited a considerable 
variation across provinces. 
Finally, it is unlikely that crime consideration has been directly taken into the 
decision process of the family planning program in China, since the primary objec-
tive of this birth control program is to control the population growth. Moreover, the 
family planning program has been carried out by the National Family Planning Com-
mission and its branches at various lower administrative levels, which is independent 
of the judiciary system. For example, in Peng (1996), which is a major Chinese 
publication on China's population and family planning collecting an exhaustive set 
of regulations and guidelines made by the government since the early 1950s, there is 
not even one place mentioned that any one of the population policies is motivated 
by crime considerations. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that population policy or 
organization 16 years earlier would be affected by crimes today. 
We then conduct the first-stage estimation to empirically examine the validity 
of the four instrumental variables. The first two columns in Table 3 report the 
first-stage of the FE-IV estimation by regressing the sex ratio on IVs and other 
explanatory variables without and with the police expenditure, respectively. In ad-
dition, we also report the joint F-statistics for the IVs. Results show that IVs have 
a good explanatory power for the sex ratio, because the coefficients on IVs are both 
individually and jointly statistically significant. Although the p-values of the joint 
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significance tests for IVs in both specifications are all smaller than 0.005，it should be 
acknowledged that our FE-IV method may suffer from weak instruments problem, 
since the F-statistics of the instruments are smaller than 10 which is suggested as 
the rule of thumb indicating strong instrument for identification (Staiger and Stock, 
1997; Stock and Yogo, 2005). Columns (3)-(4) in Table 3 report the reduced-form 
estimates, which indicate that those IVs are jointly, while marginally, significant in 
the crime equation. Combining the result of a highly significant effect of the sex ratio 
on crime rates in the fixed effects model reported in Table 2 and the results of the 
first-stage estimation, it may imply that the implementation of the family planning 
program could have an indirect effect on crime rates through the sex ratio. 
Although the possibility of the endogeneity of sex ratios in the crime equation 
has been discussed above, we also carry out a statistical check for this endogeneity 
problem by employing the Wu-Hausman test. We first regress the sex ratio Sa on all 
the IVs and other explanatory variables X^ controlling for both the province- and 
year- fixed effects, and obtain the residuals da. Then we include vu in Eq.(14), and 
obtain the ^-statistic on vu. The null hypothesis is that the sex ratio is exogenous 
in the crime equation. However, the Wu-Hausman test gives us a ^-statistic of 1.789 
with a p-value of 0.074. Hence, the FE-IV is probably a good idea, because the 
result of the Wu-Hausman test gives evidence of weak endogeneity of sex ratios in 
the crime equation significant at the 10% level. 
Table 4 reports the FE-IV estimates with the heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. Because there are four instrumental variables while only one endogenous 
variable in estimating Eq.(14), the equation is overidentified，calling for a test of the 
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exogeneity of the extra instruments. To test the overidentifying restrictions, we run 
the Sargan-Hansen test by regressing the residuals from the second stage regression 
of the FE-IV estimation on all of the explanatory variables plus the IVs, and obtain 
the unadjusted R^. We then compute N x R^ as the Sargan's statistic, where N is 
the number of observations. Under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments 
are valid, and the instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, 
the test statistic is distributed as x^ with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
overidentifying restrictions. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, Sargan's statistic 
becomes the Hansen J-statistic.^ The p-values for the Hansen J-statistics reported 
in all specifications in Table 4 are consistently larger than 0.40, suggesting that there 
lacks sufficient evidence to reject the validity of these IVs conditioning on a correctly 
specified model and on at least one of the four instrumental variables being a valid 
one. 
In the first column of Table 4，we report a simple FE-IV estimation with the 
only independent variable of sex ratios after controlling for province- and year-fixed 
effects. This regression shows that the sex ratio has a positive effect on crime rates 
at a high significance level of 1%. Columns (2)-(4) report the results of the FE-IV 
estimations of the effect of sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior by adding other 
socioeconomic and demographic variables step by step. Consistent with the results 
of the fixed effects estimations in Table 3, the estimated coefficient on the sex ratio in 
the FE-IV model is robust to the inclusion of other variables in the crime equation, 
which implies that the imbalance of the sex ratio towards male may indeed have a 
9For a further discussion see, for example, Hayashi (2000，p. 227-8, 407’ 417). 
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causal effect on the criminal behavior. 
Comparing the results between the fixed effects estimation of Table 2 with the 
FE-IV estimation of Table 4’ however, an interesting finding is that the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients on sex ratios is consistently larger in the FE-IV estima-
tion than in the fixed effects model. Contrary to the simultaneity story advanced 
by Mitra (1992) and Oldenburg (1992), in which the endogeneity of sex ratios is 
assumed to arise from the simultaneity between the violence and the son preference, 
we suggest that the downward bias of the fixed effects estimates may be the result 
of the measurement error of sex ratios discussed in the previous section. In the pres-
ence of classical errors-in-variables, i.e., the measurement error is correlated with the 
observed sex ratio, the regression coefficient is necessarily attenuated. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients for other socioeconomic variables largely 
remain the same in the FE-IV estimation as in the fixed effects estimation. The FE-
IV estimates in Table 4 imply that the elasticities of the crime rate with respect to the 
sex ratio range from 6.78 to 10.38 when the sex ratio is evaluated at its sample mean 
of 106. Since the elasticity estimates are larger than the upper bound when only the 
demographic composition effect is accounted for, which has been demonstrated in 
Section 2.1，the mechanism by which high sex ratios increase crime rates operates 
not only through the demographic composition effect, but also through the marriage 
threshold effect. Then, the increase of sex ratios has really changed the demographic-
specific group's crime rate. 
lOFor a further discussion sec, e.g., Wooldridge (2002). 
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2.5 Robust Tests 
Although the previous analysis found that the increase of sex ratios has had a sig-
nificantly positive effect on crime rates, we need to make sure that it is not conta-
minated with measurement errors, and is not mainly picking up the effect of other 
policy shocks or socioeconomic changes. Hence, this section conducts the robust 
analysis by replacing the sex ratio with its counterpart projected by the Chinese 
population census in 1982, and the crime rate with the criminal prosecution rate, to 
test problems arising from measurement errors, and replacing the crime rate with 
the corruption rate to test problems arising from omitted variables, respectively. 
2.5.1 Measurement Error of Sex Ratios 
As we have discussed in previous sections, the projected variable of the sex ratio 
involves measurement error problems. Although we have tried to control the inter-
province migration in the crime equation, if the measurement error is correlated 
with the observed sex ratio, as in the assumption of the classical errors-in-variables 
(CEV), then the fixed effects estimator may suffer from the attenuation bias. Fur-
thermore, if the measurement error is correlated with the instruments, i.e., with the 
implementation of the family planning program in China, the FE-IV estimates could 
also be biased. 
Hence, we employ an alternative measure of the sex ratio projected by the Chi-
nese population census in 1982 as a robust test. The primary benefit of using this 
alternative measure of sex ratios is that the cross provincial migration is less frequent 
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at the early stage of China's economic reform period from the late 1970s. Since the 
nearest year projected for the age cohort of 16-25 by the 1982 census is 1998, the 
total number of observations for the 26 provinces over the period of 1988-1998 is then 
286.11 Columns (l)-(2) in Table 5 report the FE-IV estimates with this alternative 
measure of sex ratios without and with the police expenditure, respectively. The 
estimated coefficients on this alternative measure are still positive and statistically 
significant at a high level of 1%. It indicates that the cross provincial migration is 
indeed not a serious problem in our FE-IV estimation. 
Another concern with the measurement error of sex ratios is not from the projec-
tion, but from the census itself. As it has been cautioned by Zeng et al., (1993) and 
Croll (2000), the female births may be under-reported under the one-child policy 
regime in China. Thus, the quality of the census data set itself may suffer from the 
problem of measurement errors. Without further information, we cannot explore 
this problem. However, we believe it will not matter too much. On the one hand, 
as found by Banister (2004) and Cai and Lavely (2005), the high sex ratios in the 
Chinese demographic data are approximately true, and most of the missing girls in 
the 1990 census are still not enumerated in the 2000 census. On the other hand, most 
experts believe that the problem of unregistered female births in China is focused on 
the age cohort less than 6 before the enrollment of school. Since the projected age 
range in the 1990 census is from 2 to 27 in our empirical analysis, the share of the 
children aged from 2 to 5 out of the total observation is very small. In addition, the 
11 Hainan was still included in Guangdong in the 1982 census, and the four municipalities dircctly 
under the central government are dropped in our empirical analysis. Thus, the number of provinces 
is 26. 
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variable of sex ratios is defined over a 10-year age bracket, then this measurement 
error problem should not be so severe. 
2.5.2 Measurement Error of Crime Rates 
Although it is traditionally less important to consider the measurement error in 
the dependent variable than in independent variables, it is interesting to examine 
the measurement error of crime rates in this chapter. If the measurement error of 
the dependent variable is not correlated with the independent variable, none of the 
large-sample properties of the OLS estimation is violated, and the only concern is a 
larger error variance than without measurement error. However, if the measurement 
error of the dependent variable is correlated with the explanatory variable, it can 
also cause biases in the OLS estimation. Furthermore, if this measurement error is 
correlated with the IVs, it could also bias our FE-IV estimator, though there is no 
priori information in this respect. 
Hence, we carry out the FE-IV estimation with an alternative measure of the 
crime rate, the criminal prosecution rate, as the dependent variable. Although both 
the crime rate, defined by the arrest rate, and the prosecution rate, measure the 
same two kinds of criminal activities, violence and property offences, they are is-
sued by different departments. In the Chinese legal system, the arrest statistics 
are documented by the People's Procuratorates, while the prosecution statistics are 
documented by the People's Courts. Columns (3)-(4) in Table 5 report the FE-IV 
estimates with a dependent variable of prosecution rates. It is reassuring to find 
that the estimated coefficients on the sex ratio are significantly positive, though the 
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magnitude of the estimated effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior 
has experienced a little decrease by comparing to its counterpart in Table 4. This 
indicates that the problem of measurement errors in crime rates is not severe in our 
empirical analysis. 
2.5.3 Omitted Variables 
The key assumption underlying the validity for the instruments is that they should 
not be correlated with the error term £让 in Eq.(14). If there are other unobservable 
policy shocks or changes in socioeconomic variables being correlated with the imple-
mentation of the one-child policy during the past two decades, our FE-IV estimates 
may have picked up the effect of these policies or changes. Although we do not 
have a priori knowledge on any of this kind of unobservable shocks or variables, we 
attempt to justify the robustness of our FE-IV estimates to omitted variables by an 
empirical strategy of replacing the dependent variable with the corruption rate. If 
our FE-IV estimate is really picking up the effect of other omitted variables, on the 
one hand, we would expect that the estimated effect of the sex ratio on corruption 
rates should be similar to the effect on crime rates. The reason is that the corrup-
tion rate, as another criminal justice indicator, would likely be affected by the same 
omitted variables in the error term eu of Eq.(14). 
However, on the other hand, it is expected that the sex ratio should not have 
a significant effect on corruption rates in the case of no other omitted variables. 
Firstly, the motivation of committing corruption is evidently different from those of 
violence and property offences. Secondly, these two categories of crimes have been 
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formulated in different theoretical frameworks. ^ ^ Finally, the potential offenders be-
tween corruption crime and violence and property crimes are centralized at different 
demographic and social groups. While violence and property offences are primarily 
made by the youngers and blue collars, corruption is a relatively high-skill crime and 
committed by elders and white collars. 
The FE-IV estimates for the new dependent variable of corruption rates, which 
are reported in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 5，suggest that our previous 
estimates of the effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior could not be 
mainly driven by other unobserved policy shocks or socioeconomic changes. In both 
columns, the estimated coefficients on the sex ratio are negative and statistically 
insignificant at any reasonable levels. Hence, our FE-IV estimates are not likely 
picking up the effect of other policy shocks or socioeconomic development. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter formulates the mechanism by which high sex ratios increase crime 
rates. Two kinds of channels have been introduced which are complementary to 
each other; one is through the change of the demographic composition, and the 
other is through the increase of the marriage threshold. Under risk aversion and 
other reasonable assumptions, the theoretical model predicts a positive effect of 
the sex ratios imbalance on criminal activities not only through the demographic 
composition effect, but also through the marriage threshold effect on males. An 
12See Shleifcr and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Ehrlich and Liu (1999)，and Acemoglu and 
Verdier (2000) for the theoretical and empirical analysis of corruption. 
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empirical model is then specified and implemented by using a panel data set of 27 
provinces in China over 17 years. Considering the endogeneity of sex ratios in the 
crime equation, the timing of the Chinese family planning program is employed as 
a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of sex ratios imbalance on crime 
rates. It is found that, consistent with the theoretical prediction, the imbalance of 
sex ratios towards males increases crime rates through both channels. This finding 
is robust even if we control for other socioeconomic variables and in a series of 
sensitivity tests. 
A large number of studies have focused on the effect of sex ratios imbalance on 
the female's bargaining power within the household and the labor supply in the 
labor market. This chapter approaches the problem of sex ratios imbalance from 
another perspective and studies its effect on criminal behavior. Our findings have 
corroborated a widely accepted point of view that the demographic change of sex 
ratios could have far-reaching social and economic consequences. It is hoped that 
this chapter, as a first attempt to deal with a neglected yet important aspect of 
the problem of the sex ratios imbalance, will stimulate further studies to extend the 
dimensions of other socioeconomic outcomes of this gender bias problem, which has 
been an aggravating epidemic in China, and in eastern and southern Asia at large. 
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Figure 1: Sex ratio by birth cohort 
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Figure 3: Han-Minorities difference by birth cohort 
~I 1 - \ 1 1 1 1 1 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Birth year 
Figure 4: Sex ratio by han and minorities in rural areas 
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Figure 5: Han-Minorities difference in rural areas 
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Figure 6: Sex ratio by han and minorities in urban areas 
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Figure 7: Han-Minorities difference in urban areas 
Iv/Vv 
I , 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Birth year 
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Note: DDI refers to DD estimates without any control variables, i.e. Column 5 in Table 3. 
DD2 refers to DD estimates controlling for provincial indictors, i.e. Column 6 in Table 3. 
DD3 refers to DD estimates controlling for both provincial and rural indicators, i.e. 
Column 7 in Table 3. 
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Figure 9: Difference between D D estimates 
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Note: Difference 1 refers to the difference between the DD estimates without and with 
provincial indicators, i.e., the difference between Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3; 
Difference 2 refers to the difference between the DD estimators without and with both 
provincial and registration type indicators, i.e., the difference between Columns (5) and 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Summary statistics: Han versus national minorities 
Sample 1 Sample 2 
Variables Han Minorities Han Minorities 
Gender 0.5202 0.5134 0.5245 0.5137 
(0.4996) (0.4998) (0.4994) (0.4998) 
Rural 0.8372 0.8751 0.8607 0.8811 
(0.3691) (0.3306) (0.3463) (0.3236) 
Treat 0.6047 0.6125 0.8037 0.8211 
(0.4889) (0.4872) (0.3972) (0.3832) 
Mother illiterate 0.2220 0.3400 
(0.4156) (0.4737) 
Mother primary 0.4262 0.3845 
(0.4945) (0.4865) 
Mother junior 0.2586 0.1953 
(0.4379) (0.3964) 
Mother senior and higher 0.0932 0.0801 
(0.2908) (0.2715) 
Father illiterate 0.0545 0.1345 
(0.2270) (0.3412) 
Father primary 0.3527 0.3787 
(0.4778) (0.4851) 
Father junior 0.4161 0.3317 
(0.4929) (0.4708) 
Father senior and higher 0.1768 0.1551 
(0.3815) (0.3620) 
Family size 2.2253 2.6599 
(0.9845) (1.1955) 
Observations 3,482,239 374,250 1,709,916 170,406 
Note: Standard error is in parentheses. Sample 1 includes all children aged from 0 to 17 in the Chinese 
population census in 1990 (1% sample) with age, gender, registration type and geographic location 
information. Sample 2 restricts Sample 1 to those children satisfying the following conditions: (i) sons or 
daughters of household heads; (ii) mothers' age is ranged from 20 to 38; (iii) with complete information of 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Differences-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the gender of the 
child by birth order 
Han Minorities Han-Minorities 
Birth order = 1 
Pre-Treatment 0.5107 0.5066 0.0041 ( 1 . 1 0 ) ~ 
Post-Treatment 0.5127 0.5051 0.0076 (3.61) 
D D 0.0035 (0.82) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0034 (0.80) 
Birth order = 2 
Pre-Treatment 0.5165 0.5073 0.0092 (1.66) 
Post-Treatment 0.5380 0.5195 0.0185 (7.66) 
DD 0.0093 (1.53) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0099* (1.65) 
Birth order > 2 
Pre-Treatment 0.5228 0.5194 0.0034 (0.32) 
Post-Treatment 0.5559 0,5267 0.0293 (9.88) 
D D 0.0259** (2.32) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0252** (2.26) 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, 
otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 2 with a total of 1,880,322 observations. Row 3 of each panel 
reports the DD estimates without control variables and Row 4 of each panel reports the DD estimates 
controlling for rural, province, and mother and father's education level dummies. 
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Table 1.6; Differences-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the gender of the 
child by birth order and gender composition of elder siblings 
Han Minorities Han-Minorities 
Birth order = 1 
Pre-Treatment 0.5107 0.5066 0.0041 ( U ^ ~ 
Post-Treatment 0.5127 0.5051 0.0076 (3.61) 
DD 0.0035 (0.82) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0034 (0.80) 
Birth order = 2 
One boy Pre-Treatment 0.5057 0.4964 0.0094 (1.19) 
Post-Treatment 0.5044 0.5059 -0.0015 (0.43) 
DD -0.0109 (1.26) 
DD (with control variables) -0.0107 (1.24) 
One girl Pre-Treatment 0.5269 0.5183 0.0086 (1.09) 
Post-Treatment 0.5689 0.5326 0.0363 (10.77) 
DD 0.0277*** (3.22) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0279*** (3.24) 
Birth order > 2 
Two boys Pre-Treatment 0.4901 0.5283 -0.0383 (1.68) 
Post-Treatment 0.4314 0.4963 -0.0649 (10.08) 
D D -0.0266 (1.13) 
DD (with control variables) ‘ -0.0170 (0.73) 
One girl, one boy Pre-Treatment 0.5161 0.5179 -0.0018 (0.12) 
Post-Treatment 0.5305 0.5183 0.0122 (2.76) 
DD 0.0141 (0.87) 
D D (with control variables) 0.0141 (0.87) 
Two girls Pre-Treatment 0.5522 0.5148 0.0374 (1.90) 
Post-Treatment 0.6340 0.5594 0.0746 (14.91) 
DD 0.0372* (1.82) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0330* (1.65) 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, 
otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 2 with a total of 1,880,322 observations. Row 3 of each panel 
reports the DD estimates without control variables and Row 4 of each panel reports the DD estimates 
controlling for rural, province, and mother and father's education level dummies. 
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Table 1.7: Differences-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the one-child policy on the gender of the 
child by family size and birth order 
Han Minorities Han-Minorities 
Family size = 1 
Pre-Treatment 0.6628 0.6562 0.0066 (0.41) 
Post-Treatment 0.5461 0.5288 0.0172 (5.10) 
DD 0.0106 (0.64) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0117 (0.72) 
Family size = 2 
Birth order = 1 Pre-Treatment 0.5480 0.5504 0.0024 (0.38) 
Post-Treatment 0.5076 0.5109 -0.0033 (1.01) 
DD -0.0009 (0.13) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0027 (0.37) 
Birth order = 2 Pre-Treatment 0.6089 0.6071 0.0018 (0.16) 
Post-Treatment 0.5900 0.5557 0.0343 (11.51) 
DD 0.0325*** (2.86) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0303*** (2.67) 
Family size > 2 
Birth order = 1 Pre-Treatment 0.4186 0.4719 -0.0533 (11.08) 
Post-Treatment 0.3837 0.4462 -0.0625 (13.07) 
DD -0.0092 (1.34) 
D D (with control variables) -0.0088 (1.28) 
Birth order = 2 Pre-Treatment 0.4445 0.4761 -0.0317 (4.91) 
Post-Treatment 0.4009 0.4560 -0.0551 (13.73) 
D D -0.0234** (3.06) 
DD (with control variables) -0.0231*** (3.02) 
Birth order > 3 Pre-Treatment 0.5228 0.5194 0.0034 (0.32) 
Post-Treatment 0.5559 0.5267 0.0293 (9.88) 
D D 0.0259** (2.32) 
DD (with control variables) 0.0252** (2.26) 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the gender of the child; it equals 1 if the child is a boy, 
otherwise 0. The data set used is Sample 2 with a total of 1,880,322 observations. Row 3 of each panel 
reports the DD estimates without control variables and Row 4 of each panel reports the DD estimates 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.1: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Crime rate 459 5.406 1.711 0.816 13.042 
Prosecution rate 459 5.353 2.027 0.420 15.663 
Corruption rate 459 4.581 2.415 0.978 17.329 
Sex ratio (based on 1990 census) 459 106.068 2.959 98.400 113.674 
Sex ratio (based on 1982 census) 286 105.137 7.742 98.401 111.912 
Per capita income 459 2.778 1.194 0.993 8.773 
Inequality 459 2.717 0.695 1.528 5.159 
Urbanization rate 459 29.973 10.970 13.113 56.011 
Unemployment rate 459 3.153 1.023 0.600 7.700 
Welfare expenditure 459 2.418 0.781 1.032 11.412 
Migration rate 459 2.237 1.291 0.310 8.680 
Cohort size 459 8.359 5.099 0.458 26.423 
Police expenditure 459 5.436 1,404 2.588 10.273 
Note: Variable definitions and data sources are described in Appendix I. Since Hainan was still included in 
Guangdong in the Chinese population census in 1982，the number of provinces in the 1982 census is 26. In 
addition, the nearest year projected for the age cohort of 16-25 by the 1982 census is 1998. Then the total 
number of observations for the 26 provinces over the period of 1988-1998 is 286. 
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Table 2.2: Fixed effect estimates of the effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior 
Dependent variable: Ln (Crime rate) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) ⑷ （5) (6) 
Sex ratio 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.042 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Per capita income 0.032 0.097 0.095 0.072 0.064 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) 
Inequality 0.096 0.133 0.118 0.133 0.114 
(0.043) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.043) 
Urbanization 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Unemployment rate 0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 0.007 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Welfare expenditure -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.019 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Migration 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.006 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Cohort size 0.013 0.013 0.016 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Police expenditure 0.036 
(0.013) 
Year trend -0.010 
(0.005) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Province-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 459 459 ^ 459 
R-squared 0.55 0.41 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.43 
Number of provinces 27 ^ ^ ^ ^ 27 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in all specifications is the crime 
rate in log form. Year dummies are included in all regressions except for Column (6)，in which the year 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: 2SLS estimates of the effect of the sex ratios imbalance on criminal behavior 
Dependent variable: Ln (Crime rate) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 一 
Sex ratio 0.064 0.066 0.074 0.098 0 097 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) 
Per capita income 0.064 0.051 0.023 -0.001 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.050) (0.052) 
Inequality 0.138 0,129 0.088 0.106 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) 
Urbanization 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Unemployment rate -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.020 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
Welfare expenditure -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Migration 0.017 0.012 0.012 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Cohort size 0.035 0.035 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Police expenditure 0.042 
(0.016) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen over-identification test 
Hansen J-statistics 2.501 1.757 1.682 1.334 0.413 
p-values 0.475 0.624 0.641 0.938 
Observations 459 459 459 459 459 
Number of provinces ^ ^ TlL 27 
Note-. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the crime rate in log form in all 
specifications. The instruments for the sex ratio are four dummy variables of the timings of the 
enactments of two family planning policies and of the establishments of two family planning 
organizations. Both the year- and province-fixed effects have been controlled for in all specifications. 
The null hypothesis of the Hansen over-identification test is that the instruments are valid instruments, 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The years of the promulgations of Regulation of Trial Implementation of the One-Child Policy (TI) and of 
the Complementary Regulation of the One-Child Policy (CR), and of the establishments of the Family 
Planning Research Centre (FPRC) and the Family Planning Association (FPA) by provinces 
Province Tl ^ FPRC FPA 
Heibei 1979 1982 1977 1980 
Shanxi 1979 1982 1986 1983 
Inner Mongolia 1982 1988 1992 1985 
Liaoning 1979 1980 1982 1981 
Jilin 1979 1984 1979 1981 
Heilongjiang 1979 1983 1983 1980 
Jiangsu 1979 1979 1976 1984 
Zhejiang 1979 1982 1985 1980 
Anhui 1979 1984 1983 1979 
Fujian 1980 1984 1986 1981 
Jiangxi 1980 1983 No. 1984 
Shandong 1979 1982 1980 1982 
Henan 1981 1982 1983 1978 
Hubei 1979 1981 1989 1981 
Hunan 1979 1982 1984 1982 
Guangdong 1978 1980 1976 1985 
Guangxi 1979 1985 1986 1985 
Hainan 1978 1980 1976 1985 
Sichuan 1979 1980 1978 1984 
Guizhou 1980 1987 1984 1984 
Yunnan 1979 1985 1980 1980 
Tibet No. 1992 No. No. 
Shaanxi 1981 1982 1990 1981 
Gansu 1979 1984 1991 1982 
Qinghai 1982 1986 No. 1982 
Ningxia 1980 1982 No. 1981 
Xinjiang \m 1984 
Note: The description and data source of the four instrumental variables are given in Appendix II. 
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• 
CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
__ i l l l l l l 
0 0 4 4 3 9 9 5 7 
